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Political Decision-Making at the
National Labor Relations Board: An 
Empirical Examination of the Board’s
Unfair Labor Practice Decisions 
through the Clinton and Bush II Years 
Amy Semet† 
Does partisan ideology influence the voting of members of multi-
member adjudicatory bodies at “independent agencies”? In studying the
federal circuit courts of appeals, scholars have found that results of cases
vary depending upon the partisan composition of the particular panel 
hearing a case. Few scholars to date, however, have systematically studied 
whether partisan panel effects occur in administrative adjudication. In this 
Article, I explore the impact that partisan ideology and panel composition 
have on the vote choices of an administrative agency rumored to be one of 
the most partisan: the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”). 
Employing an original dataset of close to 3,000 NLRB decisions from the 
William Jefferson Clinton and the George W. Bush (“Bush II”)
administrations (1993-2007), this Article presents one of the few recent 
studies of voting patterns at the NLRB on unfair labor practice disputes. I
find that the propensity of a panel to reach a decision favoring labor
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increases monotonically with each additional Democrat added to the panel. 
I also find that the partisanship effect is generally asymmetric, meaning that
compared to homogenous panels, the addition of a single Democrat to an 
otherwise Republican panel influences the magnitude of the pro-labor vote 
choice more so than the addition of a Republican to an otherwise Democratic 
panel. Homogenous Republican panels behave in especially partisan ways. I 
further find that political actors—such as Congress, the President, and the 
appellate courts—fail to have a direct impact on NLRB unfair labor practice 
decisions; rather, the decision of the lower court Administrative Law Judge 
(“ALJ”) and the partisan ideology of the Board have the most impact in 
influencing whether the NLRB rules for or against labor. These findings have 
significant implications for a number of controversies, including debates
about agency independence as well as questions concerning political
diversity on agencies that have multi-member adjudicatory bodies who do all
or primarily all of their work through adjudication as opposed to rulemaking. 
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2. Rulemaking on Major Issues ............................................ 287 
3. Changing the Appointment Process ................................. 289 
C. Future Research and Conclusions ........................................... 291 
INTRODUCTION
In December 2012, the Republican-led House of Representatives
Oversight and Government Reforms Committee issued a report, entitled 
President Obama’s Pro-Union Board: The NLRB’s Metamorphosis from 
Independent Regulator to Dysfunctional Union Advocate, lambasting the 
National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) for the supposed “pro-union” bias 
of its decisions.1 The House committee expressed particular indignation with 
the Board’s decision blocking the airplane manufacturer Boeing’s plan to
move a plant to South Carolina, a state with laws unfriendly to labor unions.2 
The House report came on the heels of increased partisan tension over the 
work of the Board.3 Republicans decried President Barack Obama’s attempts 
to make recess appointments to the Board, resulting in the Board operating 
with just two members for well over a year and causing a constitutional
showdown at the Supreme Court in 2010.4 The NLRB is not the only
independent agency accused of political bias but it is often cited as the poster 
child for partisanship in agency decision-making.5 
This episode between President Obama and Congress over the NLRB 
harkens back to similar disputes in the past.6 As President Obama noted in 
his response when he distanced himself from the tension of the Boeing case,
the NLRB is, after all, an “independent agency,” and should have some
political autonomy separate from the whims of executive and legislative 
1. STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, 112TH CONG., PRESIDENT OBAMA’S 
PRO-UNION BOARD: THE NLRB’S METAMORPHOSIS FROM INDEPENDENT REGULATOR TO
DYSFUNCTIONAL UNION ADVOCATE 4 (Dec. 13, 2012), http://oversight.house.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2012/12/NLRB-Report-FINAL-12.13.12.pdf.
2. See id.; Boeing Int’l Assoc. of Machinists, N.L.R.B., No. 19-CA-32431, 2011 WL 2597601
(June 20, 2011). In the case, the ALJ granted a motion to dismiss. See id.
3. STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, PRESIDENT OBAMA’S PRO-UNION 
BOARD: THE NLRB’S METAMORPHOSIS FROM INDEPENDENT REGULATOR TO DYSFUNCTIONAL UNION
ADVOCATE. 
4. See New Process Steel, L.P. v. N.L.R.B., 560 U.S. 674 (2010) (holding, in a five-Justice 
majority decision, that two members hearing an NLRB case were insufficient for a quorum).
5. See, e.g., Floyd Norris, Independent Agencies, Sometimes in Name Only, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 
2013, at B1. Other recent examples abound. For instance, the regional branch of the IRS has been accused
of politicization in its granting of tax exemptions. See Alan Farnham, IRS Has Long History of Political
Dirty Tricks, ABC NEWS, May 15, 2013, http://abcnews.go.com/Business/irs-irs-long-history-dirty-
tricks/story?id=19177178; John A. Andrew III, POWER TO DESTROY: THE POLITICAL USES OF THE IRS
FROM KENNEDY TO NIXON (2002).
6. For a historical account of NLRB history, see James A. Gross, BROKEN PROMISE: THE
SUBVERSION OF U.S. LABOR RELATIONS POLICY, 1947-1994 (2010) [hereinafter Gross, BROKEN
PROMISE].
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preferences. President Obama’s words echo then-Senator John F. Kennedy’s
statement in 1954 that the NLRB “is not a policymaking branch of the 
administration which should be filled by one whose philosophy of labor is in 
keeping with the views of the political party in power.”7 Yet, despite what
politicians may say about the NLRB’s purpose, scholars, politicians, and 
Board members themselves have chastised the Board for being such a 
“political animal.”8 Former Board member Guy Farmer contended that while 
the White House did not necessarily dictate Board outcomes, he, as a Board
member, felt pressure to implement “the philosophy that he thought his 
administration wanted him to project on the Board.”9 So, the questions 
remain: how much does partisan ideology impact the decisions of the Board 
in its unfair labor disputes? Is it fair for the Board’s critics to accuse it of 
political bias? Can presidents indirectly control the Board through strategic 
use of appointments? Indeed, what is the exact nature of political control over 
so-called independent agencies?
This Article addresses these questions by examining the unfair labor 
disputes of the NLRB during the presidencies of William Jefferson Clinton 
and George W. Bush (“Bush II”). Specifically, it looks at the impact that 
partisan ideology and panel composition have in whether the NLRB issues a
decision for or against labor.10 Using multivariate statistical analysis, I find
7. 100 CONG. REC. 2004 (1954). Senator Kennedy continued: “It is not a tripartite body, to which 
representatives of labor and management should be appointed. Its members do not serve at the pleasure 
of the President, nor for a term of years concurrent with the Presidential tenure . . . . [It] is instead a quasi-
judicial agency, whose primary function is to interpret and apply the basic labor relations law of the 
land . . . . Board members are, in effect judges.” Id.
8. See Gross, BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 6, at 97 (quoting NLRB member Guy Farmer), 275 
(noting that a “presidential administration can make or change labor policy without legislative action
through appointments to the NLRB” and that “national labor policy is in a shambles in part because its
meaning seems to depend primarily on which political party won the last election”); Cole D. Taratoot,
Review of Administrative Law Judge Decisions by the Political Appointees of the NLRB, 1991-2006, 23
J. OF PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 551, 565-67 (2013) [hereinafter Taratoot, Review of Administrative 
Law Judge Decisions]; Ronald Turner, Ideological Voting on the National Labor Relations Board, 8 U.
PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 707, 711 (2006); William N. Cooke et al., The Determinants of NLRB Decision-
Making Revisited, 48 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 237, 241-42, 255 (1995); Terry M. Moe, Control and
Feedback in Economic Regulation: The Case of the NLRB, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1094, 1102 (1985); 
William N. Cooke & Frederick H. Gautschi III, Political Bias in NLRB Unfair Labor Practice Decisions, 
35 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 539, 549 (1982); Myron Roomkin, A Quantitative Study of Unfair Labor 
Practice Cases, 34 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 245, 251 (1981); Charles D. Delorme, Jr. et al., The
Determinants of Voting by the National Labor Relations Board on Unfair Labor Practice Cases: 1955-
1975, 37 PUB. CHOICE 207, 216-17 (1981); Charles D. Delorme, Jr. & Norman J. Wood, Presidential
Labor Relations Philosophy and the NLRB, 12 AKRON BUS. & ECON. REV. 31, 31 (1981); Samuel Scher,
The Politics of Agency Organization, 15 W. POL. Q. 328, 328 (1962). 
9. JAMES A. GROSS, THE MAKING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD: A STUDY IN 
ECONOMICS, POLICY, AND THE LAW (1974) [hereinafter GROSS, MAKING]; JAMES A. GROSS, THE 
RESHAPING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD: NATIONAL LABOR POLICY IN TRANSITION
1937-1947 (1981) [hereinafter GROSS, RESHAPING]. 
10. Consistent with the way it is used by others, I define ideology to mean voting with respect to 
either the Board member’s partisan affiliation or to the professional background of said member (i.e., 
members hailing from labor backgrounds would be more liberal while members from management would























    
   
  
    
  
    
  
    
 2272016 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
that panel composition matters, with Democratic appointees being
significantly more likely than Republican appointees to vote in favor of labor. 
The impact varies depending upon the time frame, with partisanship playing 
a greater role since the start of Clinton’s second term. Moreover, a 
Democratic appointee sitting with other Democrats is much more likely to
find in favor of the pro-labor litigant than a Democratic appointee siting with 
two Republican appointees. I also find that the partisanship effect is generally 
asymmetric, meaning that compared to homogenous panels, the effect of 
adding a single Democrat to an otherwise Republican panel influences the
magnitude of the pro-labor vote choice more so than the addition of a
Republican to an otherwise Democratic panel. The partisan ideology of the 
Board—as well as the ideological tone of the decision by the lower court
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)—are the most important factors 
motivating the Board’s decisions. Contrary to other studies, I also find that 
the President, Congress, and the reviewing appellate courts appear to have 
little direct bearing on how the NLRB rules, indicating that the effect these 
other political actors may have on the Board is, at most, indirect. 
This Article contributes to a greater understanding of the adjudicatory 
functions of administrative agencies. Administrative agencies may be labeled
“independent” because they have design features intended to ensure that they
will not be beholden to the whims of political actors. Federal administrative 
agencies handle a host of litigation disputes ranging from deciding Social 
Security benefits, to adjudicating representation elections in labor disputes, 
to deciding how much wounded veterans should receive in disability benefits. 
These agencies are charged with making important decisions that impact 
countless Americans every day. Indeed, many, if not most Americans, will
have some encounter with administrative adjudication, either at the federal 
or state level. Yet despite the importance of administrative adjudication, 
scholars have paid scant attention to it.11 
be more conservative). See Turner, supra note 8, at 711. Admittedly, ideology is a nebulous concept and 
there are different ways that it can be measured. See, e.g., Corey Rayburn Yung, Judged by the Company 
You Keep: An Empirical Study of the Ideologies of Judges on the United States Courts of Appeals, 51 B.C.
L. REV. 1133, 1138-53 (2006) for a discussion [hereinafter Judged by the Company You Keep]. Yung, for 
instance, proposes a Partisanship and Independence Score that he says predicts when court of appeals
justices will dissent, concur or reverse. See Corey Rayburn Yung, Beyond Ideology: An Empirical Study 
of Partisanship and Independence in the Federal Courts, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 505, 531 (2012).
11.  There have been, however, some excellent studies of the determining factors of administrative 
adjudication. See, e.g., Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette: 
Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295 (2007) (analyzing asylum decisions); see also
Taratoot, Review of Administrative Law Judge Decisions, supra note 8 (analyzing NLRB decisions); Cole 
D. Taratoot, The Politics of Administrative Law Judge Decision Making at the Environmental Protection
Agency in Civil Penalty Cases, 42 AMER. POL. RES. 114 (2014) (analyzing ALJ decision-making in
environmental cases) [hereinafter Taratoot, The Politics of Administrative Law Judge Decision Making]; 
Cole D. Taratoot & Robert M. Howard, The Labor of Judging: Examining Administrative Law Judge 
Decisions, 39 AM. POL. RES. 832 (2011) (analyzing NLRB ALJ decisions).
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In Part I, I analyze past stories and studies of NLRB decision-making. I 
first discuss in Part I.A the impact of partisan ideology on NLRB decisions, 
as reflected in anecdotal evidence and in Part I.B, I dissect the few scholarly 
studies that have examined the phenomenon. I move in Part I.C to analyzing 
the limitations of the current literature. In Part II, I turn to the study at hand. 
I first orient the study within the broader scholarship regarding panel effects 
in the appellate courts in Part II.A. Then, in Part II.B, I set forth my empirical
strategy to assess how partisan ideology impacts vote choice on the NLRB
during the Clinton and Bush II presidencies. In Part II.C, I present and
analyze the data in a general fashion to assess how far the Board has strayed
from its initial mission of being a dispassionate expert. I then present the 
multivariate statistical analysis. In Part II.D, I describe the variables and in 
Part II.E, I analyze the statistical results detailing how panel effects operate 
at the Board. Finally, I devote Part III.A to discussing the analysis’s
conclusions, before making policy recommendations and proposals for future
research in Parts III.B and III.C, respectively. 
I. 
THE NLRB: A POLITICIZED AGENCY MOTIVATED BY PARTISAN 
IDEOLOGY? 
Much ink has been spilled lambasting the NLRB for its supposedly
partisan decision-making.12 In this Part, I discuss both the anecdotal and
scholarly literature on the NLRB’s politicization. In Part I.A, I present a 
retelling of some of the anecdotal evidence of the importance that
partisanship has played at the NLRB. I then turn in Part I.B to a discussion
of the scholarly studies concerning empirical analysis of the NLRB’s 
decision-making. Finally, in Part I.C, I discuss the limitations of the present
research for understanding NLRB decision-making. 
A. Anecdotal Evidence of Partisanship and Flip-Flops at the NLRB 
Unlike life-tenured federal judges, NLRB appointees are known as “in-
and-outers”13 who are nominated by the president for their particular 
ideological views and who return to their prior labor or management 
12. See, e.g., Gross, BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 6, at 97 (noting that the Board is a “political
animal” and has been “since its inception”); Charles Fried, Five to Four: Reflections on the School 
Voucher Case, 116 HARV. L. REV. 163, 179 (2002) (“The Board pretends to act like a court solemnly 
arriving at the correct interpretation of a legislative command, but in fact acts like politicians carrying out 
their electoral mandate to favor labor or to favor management.”). 
13. See generally Linda L. Fisher, Fifty Years of Presidential Appointments, in  THE IN-AND-
OUTERS: PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTEES AND TRANSIENT GOVERNMENT IN WASHINGTON (G. Calvin 
Mackenzie ed., 1987) (analysis of 1985 study by the National Academy of Public Administration).





















   
    













    
  
  
 2292016 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
employment upon completion of Board service.14 In his authoritative history 
of the Board, labor historian James Gross contends that Board decision-
making shifts depending upon who occupies the White House.15 Ronald
Turner echoes this view, noting that while it may be the case that about 90%
of NLRB outcomes are unanimous, ideology nonetheless is a “persistent and, 
in many cases, a vote-predictive factor when the Board decides certain legal 
issues.”16 In his article, Turner details thirteen substantive legal issues in
which ideology appeared to motivate Board outcomes.17 
Scholars argue that politicization is rampant in the work of the Board
with Democratic members behaving differently than Republican members.
For instance, Catherine Fisk and Deborah Malamud contend that “[a]cross a
range of doctrinal arenas, it is apparent that Bush II labor policy made a 
decisive shift in favor of protecting managerial prerogatives and augmenting 
the ability of employers and employees to oppose unionization.”18 For 
instance, they cite data on the General Counsel’s propensity to seek 
injunctive relief under section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act 
(“NLRA” or “the Act,” also known as the “Wagner Act”).19 During the Bush
II presidency, the General Counsel made between fifteen and twenty-eight 
requests yearly, while during the Clinton presidency, the number of requests 
14. As Joan Flynn notes, service on the Board, especially for management lawyers, is often merely 
a short “hiatus” from an otherwise long career representing management. Joan Flynn, A Quiet Revolution 
on the Board: The Transformation of the NLRB, 1935-2000, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361, 1399, 1401 (2000).
15. See, e.g., Gross, BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 6, at 275 (noting that “a presidential 
administration can make or change labor policy without legislative action through appointments to the 
NLRB” and that “national labor policy is in shambles in part because its meaning seems to depend
primarily on which political party won the last election”).
16. Turner, supra note 8, at 711. 
17. See id. at 716-51. In 2014, he updated his analysis, particularly focusing on bargaining over 
employer relocation decisions. Ronald Turner, Ideological Voting on the National Labor Relations Board
Revisited, 14 HOUS. BUS. & TAX J. 24 (2014). Julia Tomassetti also analyzes a subset of labor opinions to
finds partisan differences in the standards applied. Julia Tomassetti, Who Is a Worker? Partisanship, the 
National Labor Relations Board, and the Social Content of Employment, 37 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 815 
(2012).
18. Catherine L. Fisk & Deborah C. Malamud, The NLRB in Administrative Law Exile: Problems 
with Its Structure and Function and Suggestions for Reform, 58 DUKE L.J. 2013, 2020 (2009). According
to Fisk and Malamud, these doctrinal areas include: limiting the availability of the voluntary recognition
of unions, the scope of section 7 protections for mutual aid protections, and the use of interim injunctions
under section 10(j) for violation of unfair labor practice laws. Id. Fisk and Malamud compare the style of
reasoning between the Bush and Clinton Boards on two issues: voluntary decisions about recognition or
withdrawal of recognition of unions and how the Board describes how it adopts older rules to new and 
changed circumstances. Id. at 2059-77.
19. Id. at 2028-31. The NLRA, otherwise known as the Wagner Act, is the NLRB’s governing 
statute enacted during its founding in 1935. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 
49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2006)). It has received major
amendments only two times: the Labor -Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101,
61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-44), and the Labor-Management Reporting & Disclosure
(Landrum-Griffin) Act, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531).
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ballooned to between forty-three and 104.20 Fisk and Malamud also take the 
Bush II Board to task for imposing higher legal standards on litigants 
pleading in favor of labor.21 At least on the surface, it appears there is a
pattern of Board members voting in accord with their ideology. 
Like scholars, Board members themselves argue that partisanship 
motivates NLRB decision-making. In his memoir, former Board Chairman 
William Gould recounts tales of the tensions between himself, Board
members, House Republicans, and the NLRB General Counsel.22 He
criticizes his fellow Board members, noting that some, such as Republican 
Charles Cohen, were obstructionist,23 while others, such as fellow Democrat
John Truesdale, “carefully [kept] a finger in the wind.”24 
The prevalent partisanship at the Board has resulted in frequent flip-
flops over some of the most important legal issues coming before the Board.25 
The Board’s determination of what constitutes a “bargaining unit” has been
a source, for instance, of frequent changes in policy.26 In the 1970s, the Board
approved bargaining units for acute care hospitals based on a “community of
interest” standard.27 By the 1980s, the Board shifted to using a “disparity of 
interest” standard for determining the appropriateness of bargaining units.28 
Moreover, the Board has continually flip-flopped over who should be 
considered an “employee” or a “supervisor” under the Act.29 
These stories fly in the face of what the NLRB’s founders envisioned 
for the Agency. The NLRB’s founders wanted it to be a “strictly 
20.  Fisk & Malamud, supra note 18, at 2029.
21. For instance, in Raley’s Supermarkets & Drug Centers, 349 N.L.R.B. 26 (2007), the Board
imposed a higher pleading requirement that the General Counsel had to meet in order to prove that the 
employer violated the labor laws. See Fisk & Malamud, supra note 18, at 2031 n.76.
22. See  WILLIAM B. GOULD, IV, LABORED RELATIONS: LAW, POLITICS, AND THE NLRB–A
MEMOIR (2000).
23. Gould says that Cohen was labeled “Doctor No” by Board members due to his obstructionist 
behavior. Id. at 55. 
24. Though Gould said that Truesdale was a “consummate senior bureaucrat,” he nevertheless 
opined that he owed his continued power on the Board to the fact that he was “carefully keeping a finger
in the wind.” Id. at 55-56.
25. See Zev J. Eigen & Sandro Garofalo, Less is More: A Case for Structural Reform of the National 
Labor Relations Board, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1879, 1887-93 (2014).
26. Id. at 1890-92.
27. Id.; see, e.g., Newton-Wellesley Hosp., 250 N.L.R.B. 409 (1980) (applying community interest
standard); Allegheny General Hosp., 239 N.L.R.B. 872 (1978) (same). 
28.  Eigen & Garofalo, supra note 25, at 1891-92 (discussing revised test).
29. See Daniel P. O’Gorman, Construing the National Labor Relations Act: The NLRB and 
Methods of Statutory Construction, 81 TEMPLE L. REV. 177, 221-35 (2008) (detailing the differing ways
the Board interprets “employee” and “supervisor”).
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nonpartisan”30 body that would cater to the public interest.31 This was a 
deliberate shift from the Board’s predecessor, the National Labor Board, 
which was an arbitral body made up of two members each from labor and 
industry and chaired by a third representative of the public interest.32 The 
decision to make the new NLRB an adjudicatory rather than arbitral body,
however, resulted in a change in the structure of the body, with “a consensus” 
that “only the public should be represented.”33 The legislative history of the 
Board’s governing act, the NLRA, confirms this interpretation: the Senate 
committee reporting the final version of the Act noted that “labor and 
management agree . . . that a small impartial board is better than a board with 
[members] representing respectively workers and employers.”34 
Appointments in the first half-century of the Board reflected this spirit, with
appointees hailing largely from the halls of academia or government
service.35 As scholar James Brudney notes, the legislative record of the Taft-
Hartley Act underscores that “there was no suggestion that the expanded
Board should be anything other than nonpartisan and impartial,” and no
indication that the Board would be anything other than neutral.36 
While there have been some breaks in this pattern, notably during the 
Eisenhower37 and Nixon38 years, the Reagan Revolution cemented the trend 
30. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON EDUC. AND LABOR, 74TH CONG. COMPARISON OF S. 2926 (73D CONG.)
AND S. 1958 (74TH CONG.) Section 3, 4 (Comm. Print 1935), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 1320 (1949).
31. See, e.g., To Create a National Labor Board: Hearings on S. 2926 Before the S. Comm. on
Educ. and Labor, 73d Cong. 329, 889 (1934), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, at 359, 927 (statement of Nathan L. Miller, General Counsel, United
States Steel Corporation) (“[T]he individuals composing [the Board] should be selected to represent one
interest and one alone, and that is the public interest.”).
32. See GROSS, MAKING, supra note 9, at 15, 25.
33. A Bill to Promote Equality of Bargaining Power Between Employers and Employees, to
Diminish the Causes of Labor Disputes, to Create a National Labor Board, and for Other Purposes:
Hearings on S. 1958 Before the S. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 74th Cong. 237, 291 (1935), reprinted in
2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 1617, 1677 (statement of 
Sen. Robert F. Wagner).
34. COMPARISON OF S. 2926 (73D CONG.) AND S. 1958 (74TH CONG.), supra note 30, at 1320.
35. For instance, the first and second chairs of the Board, Warren Madden and Harry Millis, came
from academia. See GROSS, MAKING, supra note 9, at 150; GROSS, RESHAPING, supra note 9, at 226.
36. James J. Brudney, Isolated and Politicized: The NLRB’s Uncertain Future, 26 COMP. LAB. L.
& POL’Y J. 221, 244 & n.110 (2005).
37. Eisenhower nominated Guy Farmer, a management lawyer, to the Board in 1953. Flynn, supra
note 14, at 1368-69. He also nominated, Albert Beeson, an industrial relations director, to the Board. Id.
at 1369-74. While the Farmer nomination sailed through the Senate without incident, labor mobilized in 
opposition to the Beeson nomination, though Beeson was still confirmed. Id. at 1369-71; see Charles J. 
Morris, How the National Labor Relations Board Was Stolen and How It Can Be Recovered: Taft-Hartley 
Revisionism and the National Labor Relations Board’s Appointment Process, 33 BERKELEY J. OF EMP. &
LAB. L. 1, 47-60 (2012).
38. Presidents Kennedy and Johnson stuck to the normal pattern of not nominating union or
management representatives to the Board. Flynn, supra note 14, at 1378. In 1970, in a move opposed by
the AFL, President Nixon broke with this pattern by appointing a management lawyer, Edward Miller, to
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that continues to this day of presidents making ideologically motivated 
appointments to the Board.39 As American Federation of Labor (“AFL”) 
President Lane Kirkland said during the Reagan administration, 
“appointments to the NLRB have been of a character that represents the 
perversion of that board into an instrument of anti-union employers.”40 By
the dawn of the first Bush presidency, the trend toward making ideological 
appointments to the Board had become so pronounced that the AFL no longer
even bothered to oppose the nominations.41 Presidents Bush I, Clinton, and 
Bush II continued to make ideological appointments to the Board, but each 
of them followed an unofficial norm of replacing departing union or
management representatives with another like-minded union or management 
representatives.42 Indeed, according to some studies, President Clinton 
appointed not only the three most pro-union advocates to the Board, but the 
three most pro-management ones as well.43 
The increasingly partisan appointees to the Board reflected the 
underlying transformation of the appointments process itself after the Reagan 
years.44 Until the late 1970s, the NLRB appointment process was almost seen
as a “repeat game,” with each side (Democrats and Republicans) not wanting 
to rock the boat too much for fear that later, their favored candidates would 
not be confirmed by the opposing side.45 Accordingly, the Senate exercised 
restraint and followed a norm of deference for the President’s nominees, who 
usually were fairly moderate or at least no more in favor of management or 
labor than their nominating presidents.46 But the Reagan Revolution signaled 
changes in the larger political landscape that played itself out as well with 
respect to the NLRB appointment process. Overall, President Reagan’s
appointees to federal agencies were more ideological than the appointees of 
the Board. Id. at 1378-83. Most of Nixon’s and subsequently Ford’s appointees came from management, 
while Carter did not appoint either union or management representatives to the Board. Id. at 1383.
39. See id. at 1383-92 (describing the history of President Reagan’s appointees to the Board). As
Flynn notes, President Reagan went “outside the mainstream labor relations community” to make
ideological appointments to the Board. Id. at 1384. For instance, one of his appointees, John Van de Water,
specialized in organizing campaigns to defeat unions. Id.; see also Reagan’s NLRB Tips Toward
Management, BUS. WK., July 6, 1981, at 27-28 (noting that Van de Water “advises companies that want
to resist union organizing campaigns”). 
40. House Subcommittee Plans Oversight Hearing on Change at Enforcement Division of NLRB,
1983 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) NO. 110, at A-10 (June 7, 1983).
41. Flynn, supra note 14, at 1392-93. President Bush, however, did make an attempt to appoint a 
union representative to the Board. Id. at 1393-94.
42. See id. at 1393-95. For instance, President Bush attempted to appoint a union representative to 
the Board. Id. at 1393. President Clinton became the first Democratic president to appoint management to
the Board, filling every Republican seat with a management lawyer: Charles Cohen, Peter Hurtgen, and
J. Robert Brame. Id. at 1394-95 & n.148.
43. Id. at 1412.
44. Id. at 1416.
45. Id. at 1417.
46. Id. at 1417-18.



















   
   
 
  
    
   
    
  
   
     
 
   
  
  
   
   
 2332016 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
his predecessors.47 More importantly, however, the previous norm of 
deference broke down, with both sides now willing to wage campaigns to 
preclude the confirmation of any candidate deemed too extreme to the 
opposing side.48 The process became even more contentious by the Clinton
years, with the Senate either refusing to take up nominations or else 
informally vetoing such nominations before they were even officially 
announced.49 Moreover, “package” nominations increasingly became the
norm as polarization between the political parties increased.50 As some
scholars have argued, packaging of nominees contributes to nominees being 
more partisan.51 This shift—from a presidentially directed process with
deference being the norm to one during which both Congress and the 
President compete over nominations—exacerbated the partisan turn of the
nominations, especially at the NLRB.52 Rather than agreeing on moderate 
nominations (or at least not directly opposing them), each side picks “slots” 
to fill with their chosen partisans.53 
B. Scholarly Studies of Partisanship at the NLRB 
While there has been much anecdotal evidence of the NLRB’s 
politicization, there have only been a few scholarly studies of the NLRB’s 
adjudicatory decisions, with scholars generally finding that the party of the 
appointing President influences the NLRB’s output. 
Scholars studying the topic observed broad patterns of Board member 
voting being very closely aligned with the party of the appointing President, 
with the most pro-industry voters being Republican and the most pro-labor 
47. Id. at 1384-85 & n.100.
48. Id. at 1420-26. Flynn also notes that labor was angered by the failure to pass labor law reform
during the Carter administration. Id. at 1421-22 & n.224. This prompted labor to insist that Carter violate 
appointment norms to appoint a more ideological General Counsel. Id. at 1421-22.
49. Id. at 1427-28 & n. 253.
50. Id. at 1429-30. President Clinton made two package nominations to the Board: the first in 1993-
1994, at the onset of his presidency, Senate Confirms Gould Nomination to NLRB; Feinstein, Cohen and
Browning Also Approved, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) NO. 41, at AA-1 (Mar. 3, 1994), and the second in 
1997. Senate Confirms Four Clinton Nominees Giving Labor Board Five-Member Complement, DAILY
LAB. REP. (BNA) NO. 218, at AA-1 (Nov. 12, 1997). This trend toward package appointments to the Board 
has also occurred for appointments to other federal agencies, such as the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission and the Federal Communications Commission. Flynn, supra note 14, at 1435-36.
51. Flynn, supra note 14, at 1437. The Senate’s committee system contributes to this tendency. Id.
A few select senators representing certain distinct groups have a great deal of power over who gets 
nominated, id. at 1438-39, and unlike the President, they have no incentive to necessarily nominate a
moderate to the Board. Id. at 1437-38. Rather, they are more likely to want to nominate a partisan who
appeals to whatever interest group wields power in that senator’s respective state. Id. at 1438.
52. Id. at 1445. Flynn describes this as the “you pick two, we pick two” mentality. Id.
53. Id. at 1446.
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234 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW Vol. 37:2
voters being Democratic, with one exception.54 In their study spanning the 
Board’s unfair labor practice decisions involving “novel questions” or cases 
that set “important precedents” from 1955 to 1975,55 Charles Delorme and
Norman Wood found that about three quarters of those with the most pro-
industry voting records came from management backgrounds and that Board 
members continued voting in partisan ways even when their appointing
President had left office.56 In a follow-up study, Delorme et al. looked at the 
data through a multivariate statistical analysis and found that reappointments, 
the sitting President’s party, the Board member’s party, the unemployment
rate and whether the Board member formerly worked at the NLRB to be
significant factors impacting voting.57 Another study covering the later period 
between 1985 and 2000 looked at Board votes on so-called “disputed” cases 
where at least one Board member filed a dissent.58 That study found that the
six Board members hailing from industry had the most pro-industry records 
while the three Board members who previously represented labor had the 
most pro-union voting records.59 These patterns persisted even when 
controlling for political party with the voting patterns clearly being one-
sided.60 For instance, Republican Board members Peter Hurtgen and J. Robert 
Brame voted in favor of the employer 97% and 90% of the time, respectively;
likewise, Democratic Board member Margaret Browning voted in favor of 
labor 98% of the time while fellow  Democratic members Williams Liebman
and Sarah Fox voted 92% and 91% in favor of labor, respectively.61 Further, 
voting patterns of some members appeared to grow more partisan over time,
according to the study. For instance, Democrat Fox voted 173–0 in favor of 
labor in cases from 1999 and 2000.62 In another study, William Cooke and
Frederick Gautschi expanded the Delorme et al. analysis by looking at the 
role that Board member characteristics (i.e., age, employment by
management prior to appointment, urban/rural) and political characteristics 
(i.e., percentage of Democrats in the Senate) played in decision-making.63 
The study found that none of these factors affected NLRB votes; rather, the
only factors that impacted NLRB decisions were the nature of the 
54. See id. at 1407, 1413; see also Moe, supra note 8, at 1104 (noting that Fanning’s appointment 
“may have been a colossal mistake of Earl Warren proportions by a president who failed to recognize a 
liberal-in-the-making”).
55. In its annual reports, the NLRB sets forth a list of such decisions. See NLRB ANN. REP., 
https://www.nlrb.gov/reports-guidance/reports/annual-reports (last visited Aug. 15, 2016). 
56. Delorme & Wood, supra note 8, at 31.
57.  Delorme et al., supra note 8, at 211-13.
58. Flynn, supra note 14, at 1407. Flynn cites a report, the “Employment Law Alert,” compiled by
a law firm, Nixon, Hargrave, Devans & Doyle. Id. at 1404-12.
59. See id. 
60. Id. at 1411.
61. Id. at 1410.
62. Id. at 1412.
63.  Cooke & Gautschi, supra note 8, at 543.
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appointment (party affiliation of the appointing President and of the Board
member) and the status of the litigant as a plaintiff or defendant.64 In a later 
analysis updating Delorme et al. and Cooke and Gautschi, Cooke et al. 
distinguished “important, complex” decisions from “less important, simpler”
decisions,65 and found that the political inclinations of the appointing 
President and Board member mattered for more “important” cases only with 
members being influenced by lower-level agency actors such as the ALJ for
less important cases.66 Cooke et al. also found that higher unemployment
rates led to more pro-employer votes, and the ideological composition of
Congress impacted how Board members voted.67 
Terry Moe found similar results.68 Unlike Cooke et al., he expanded
prior models to account for case mix and he also tested the impact that courts 
have in the process.69 Moe used as his dependent variable the proportion of
pro-labor decisions made by the Board each quarter between 1948 and 
1979.70 He found the Board’s voting to be responsive to macroeconomic 
pressure, such as changes in unemployment and inflation as well as to 
changes in presidential and congressional influence.71 With respect to courts,
he found support for his hypothesis that “[t]he greater the tendency of the
courts to overturn the NLRB in favor of labor rather than business, the more
prolabor the NLRB’s subsequent decisions.”72 
Several recent studies have built on the work of these scholars by 
incorporating more variables into their analyses. Cole Taratoot discovered 
that once one accounts for the ALJ decision, the impact of factors previously
found to be significant—such as political factors like the ideological 
composition of Congress—largely disappears.73 He found that the ALJ 
decision played the most important predictive role in determining NLRB case 
outcomes; he also found that the Board’s ideology impacted results, with a 
“moderate” Board generating a pro-industry decision 2.9% of the time, a split 
decision 44.3% of the time, and a pro-labor decision 52.8% of the time.74 
Taratoot further found that appellate court ideology impacted NLRB 
64. Id. at 546-48.
65.  Cooke et al., supra note 8, at 243.
66. Id. at 250-51.
67. Id. at 252.
68. See Moe, supra note 8, at 1108 tbl.2.
69. See id. at 1101, 1107.
70. Id. at 1103, 1107.
71. Id. at 1108-09.
72. Id. at 1102, 1109.
73. Taratoot, Review of Administrative Law Judge Decisions, supra note 8, at 565-67. In another 
articles, Taratoot also explored the factors that impact how the ALJ–as opposed to the Board–will rule. 
Taratoot, The Politics of Administrative Law Judge Decision Making, supra note 11; Taratoot & Howard, 
supra note 11.
74. Taratoot, Review of Administrative Law Judge Decisions, supra note 8, at 566.
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decision-making, hypothesizing that the Board is forward-thinking in making 
decisions that conform with what the appellate court might rule.75 Unlike 
previous studies, however, Taratoot contended that neither the President nor 
Congress influence outcomes.76 
However, not all scholars studying NLRB decisions have found that 
partisanship or ideology impacts decision-making. In a qualitative analysis 
of NLRB cases concerning a specific type of conduct, Paul Secunda 
concluded that institutional collegiality permeated Board decision-making, at
least with respect to decisions concerning one specific topic.77 In his study of
140 cases from 1967 to 2004, he found that Board appointees of one political 
party were no more or less likely to find a violation than appointees of the 
opposing party.78 Secunda, however, found that Democratic-majority Boards 
were more likely to find a section 8(a)(3) violation than Republican-majority 
Boards: Democratic Boards found violations in 85% of cases while 
Republican Boards found violations in just 54% of cases.79 Nonetheless, he
concluded that, at least with respect to the limited doctrinal area studied, the 
NLRB decides cases “solely on their legal merits and with the sole goal of 
getting the law right.”80 
C. Limitations of Scholarly Studies 
Many of the studies that have examined the administrative state,
especially those studying the NLRB, have been limited in focus and time.
Rather than focusing on how the Board rules, many of them focus on the
propensity of labor to prevail or they construct an index containing a ratio
with labor wins compared as a proportion of how cases are filed.81 Further, 
only a handful of the studies are recent, with most studying the NLRB prior
to the ideological turn of the Reagan years.82 Prior studies also fail to account 
for the important legal differences between cases. While some scholars
separate out cases emanating from labor and those coming from industry, no 
75. Id. at 567.
76. Id.
77. Paul M. Secunda, Politics Not As Usual: Inherently Destructive Conduct, Institutional
Collegiality, and the National Labor Relations Board, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 51, 103, 104 (2004)
(“[I]nstitutional concerns better explain why the Board is able to achieve decisional consistency in an area
of labor law ripe for political factionalism.”). Secunda does a doctrinal analysis of 140 cases he found
where the issue of inherently destructive conduct came before the Board from June 1967 to February 2004.
Id. at 79-80.
78. Id. at 87-88. Rather, he found that appointees from each party contributed almost equally. Id. 
79. Id. at 98.
80. Id. at 105.
81. See, e.g., Moe, supra note 8, at 1107.
82. For instance, Delorme & Wood and Delorme et al. only consider data prior to 1980 and 1975, 
respectively. Delorme & Wood, supra note 8, at 31; Delorme et al., supra note 8, at 207.
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analysis on NLRB decision-making makes any attempt to separate out cases
according to case type or legal issue.83 
Previous studies do not adequately capture the politicization of the 
Board because they lump together cases regarding different NLRA
violations, even though these violations allow the Board different amounts of
discretion when reaching its decisions. Most of the analysis concerns unfair 
labor practice disputes, which arise under the NLRA.84 For instance,
employers can violate section 8(a)(1) by making threats to dissuade 
employees from joining a union.85 Section 8(a)(1) cases are largely decided
on whether the employer conduct impermissibly interfered with, coerced, or 
restrained employees when they exercised their rights under section 7 of the 
Act.86 In these cases, the Board generally will weigh employer’s economic 
interests with the interests of the complaining party, such as with respect to
their right to organize.87 Discriminatory intent is irrelevant to finding a
violation.88 The underlying legal determination largely rests on questions of 
fact, and the Board has virtually no discretion to upset the credibility or
factual judgments of the ALJ.89 In contrast, discriminatory intent is key to 
finding a violation of section 8(a)(3).90 In section 8(a)(3) cases, the NLRB
must judge whether the employer’s actions are motivated by an anti-union
intent that has the foreseeable effect of discouraging employees from joining 
a union.91 Section 8(a)(5) claims, in particular, may be different in nature 
83. Scholars separate out cases based on whether the case was filed against industry or against 
labor, but few scholars studying NLRB decision-making separate out cases based on the statutory section 
challenged. James J. Brudney et al. analyze cases separately depending on the statutory section challenged 
in their analysis of appellate court review of NLRB decisions. James J. Brudney et al., Judicial Hostility
Toward Labor Unions? Applying the Social Background Model to a Celebrated Concern, 60 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1675, 1707, 1715-16 tbl. II (1999). They found that appellate court judges were less likely to favor
pro-labor litigants when challenges were raised under sections 8(a)(5), 8(b), and 10(c) than under either 
section 8(a)(1) or section 8(a)(3). Id. at 1714. In another study, Brudney also found a difference in reversal 
rates in the appellate courts with respect to sections 8(a)(5) and 9 as compared to sections 8(a)(1) and
8(a)(3). James J. Brudney, A Famous Victory: Collective Bargaining Protections and the Statutory Aging
Process, 74 N.C. L. REV. 939, 981-82 (1996).
84. See 29 U.S.C. § 160 (2012).
85. See id. § 158(a)(1).
86. See id.
87. See Brudney et al., supra note 83, at 1707.
88. See Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 269 (1965) (“A violation of 
8(a)(1) alone . . . presupposes an act which is unlawful even absent a discriminatory motive.”). 
89. In many of its opinions, the NLRB has standard language where it states that the Board’s 
“established policy is not to overrule an administrative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear 
preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.” Auto Nation, Inc., 360 
N.L.R.B. 141, 1 n.1 (2014); Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc., 91 N.L.R.B. 544, 545 (1950), enforced,
188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951) (noting credibility analysis). 
90. See Turner, supra note 8, at 77 (discussing discriminatory intent in 8(a)(3) cases).
91. See Radio Officers’ Union of Commercial Telegraphers Union v. N.L.R.B., 347 U.S. 17, 43
(1954) (“The relevance of the motivation of the employer in such discrimination has been consistently
recognized under both § 8(a)(3) and its predecessor.”). Such anti-union bias can be shown in two ways:
specific evidence of unlawful intent or inferring intent from the conduct. See id. at 44-45 (“[S]pecific
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from claims arising under other parts of the statute.92 Section 8(a)(5), which
makes it illegal for an employer to refuse to bargain in good faith,93 may give
an employer more legal wiggle room to mount a defense.94 What constitutes 
“good faith” can often be a subjective decision, and the weighing accorded
with such an analysis may give the Board more discretion to interject 
personal feelings. In summary, previous studies may fail to discern the true 
motivator of politicization because they do not distinguish between different 
types of claims under the Act, even though the Board’s discretion varies 
depending on the type of claim. This limitation calls into question the results 
of such studies, given the omission of such a potentially important variable. 
Another important distinction is that virtually all preexisting studies 
ignore split decisions, which are probably the cases that are the hardest to 
decide given that they often involve so many different legal issues.95 Many
researchers just cut out split decisions from their analysis,96 while some more 
recent scholars include split decisions, but do so in only a limited way by not 
differentiating pro-labor from pro-industry split decisions.97 
Moreover, nearly all analyses completely ignore the role of other
important Board actors. With the exception of Taratoot and Moe,98 no
analysis accounts for the deference afforded to ALJ determinations, such that 
in 80% of cases the Board merely affirms the ALJ decision.99 Moreover, 
much of the quantitative analysis of the NLRB fails to account for the ALJ 
evidence of intent to encourage or discourage is not an indispensable element of proof of violation of § 
8(a)(3). . . . Both the Board and the courts have recognized that proof of certain types of discrimination
satisfies the intent requirement.”).
92. See Brudney et al., supra note 83, at 1714-15 (concluding that appellate court judges acted
differently deciding section 8(a)(5) claims than claims arising under some other sections of the statute). 
93. Id. at 1707.
94. Brudney et al. notes that section 8(a)(5) claims “differ substantially” from claims arising under 
other sections of the NLRA. Id. at 1726. Such claims focus more on the conduct of employers as opposed
to individuals. Id. As Brudney et al. argue, “[J]udges must be comfortable both with the protected nature
of group action and with the complex dynamics generated by a clash between two collective entities, the
union and the employer.” Id.
95. See Taratoot, Review of Administrative Law Judge Decisions, supra note 8, at 559-60
(“Although initially researchers ignored split decisions (DeLorme and Wood 1978; DeLorme, Hill, and
Wood 1981; Moe 1985), the introduction of split decisions was eventually incorporated into models of 
board member decision making (Cooke and Gautschi 1982).”).
96. See Delorme et al., supra note 8, at 208 (omitting “decisions finding both union and 
management at fault”); Moe, supra note 8, at 1113.
97. See Taratoot, Review of Administrative Law Judge Decisions, supra note 8, at 559-60; Cooke 
& Gautschi, supra note 8, at 541-42 (“For the sake of simplicity and because of the intractability of 
computing a measure of the degree of support in each case, we treat any vote that finds the defendant
guilty of an [unfair labor practice] as a vote for the union (employer) if the plaintiff is the union (employer).
Thus, if a member decides that the defendant committed an [unfair labor practice], the member is 
considered to have cast his vote for the plaintiff even though the member may disagree with the plaintiff
in part.”).
98. See Taratoot, Review of Administrative Law Judge Decisions, supra note 8, at 558; Moe, supra
note 8, at 1103 (using, as one of three variables, staff filtering decisions). 
99. See, e.g., Taratoot, Review of Administrative Law Judge Decisions, supra note 8, at 559.


















   
   
 




    
 2392016 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
decision at all.100 Further, with respect to the political variables included in 
the analysis, many scholars do not account for how appellate court review
could impact NLRB decisions.101 
II. 
DOES PARTISANSHIP DRIVE NLRB VOTING? 
Despite anecdotal claims of the NLRB’s supposed politicization, the 
empirical question remains to be answered: what impact do these ideological 
appointments have in affecting the actual decision of the Agency? That is, 
are the decisions of independent agencies motivated by the sort of
dispassionate expertise that is supposed to differentiate them from other
forums? Or do the decisions of independent agencies shift according to short-
term political whims, with political ideology animating decision-making? In
other words, all else constant, would the same case be decided differently if 
there were a Democrat on the panel instead of a Republican? If that indeed is 
the case, such a pattern of decision-making could call into question the very 
expertise and stability of so-called independent agencies,102 and could raise 
the specter of whether agencies are “captured” by short-term partisan
interests.103 
The study is designed to test the impact that partisan ideology has on 
case outcomes at the NLRB and to determine whether different partisan 
configurations of the panel impact the tendency of the NLRB to vote for or
against labor. It also seeks to test the impact that other political actors such 
as Congress, the President and the appellate courts have on Board decision-
making. To orient the reader, I begin by discussing the literature concerning 
how scholars have analyzed partisanship on multi-member panels so as to
provide a background to apply to the study of the NLRB. In Part II.B, I set 
forth the empirical strategy and discuss the nature of the study and analyze 
the impact that partisan ideology and panel composition have on NLRB 
unfair labor practice decisions. I present general findings in Part II.C, 
showing graphs of how different partisan panel combinations vote on unfair
labor practice disputes. In Part II.D, I move on to present the statistical 
analysis undertaken. Finally, in Part II.E, I discuss the results along with
graphs showing how partisan panel effects operate on the Board as well as an 
analysis of what factors motivate Board decision-making. 
100. See id. at 565-67.
101. But see Taratoot, Review of Administrative Law Judge Decisions, supra note 8, at 562-63; Moe, 
supra note 8, at 1101-02.
102. See, e.g., Turner, supra note 8, at 753 (noting that if the Board “favors labor over management 
or vice versa, the agency’s output is not the output of principled adjudication as measured by the rule of
law theory. . .”).
103. See, e.g., Rachel Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 
89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 17 (2010).
Semet Formatted 9 12-1.docx (Do Not Delete) 9/13/2016 12:07 PM     














    
  
    
    
   
    
 





      
 
   
  
  
     
    
  
     
   





      
240 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW Vol. 37:2
A. What Can We Learn from Studies Regarding Panel Effects in the 
Appellate Courts? 
Supreme Court scholars often study how judicial ideology impacts the 
justices’ votes on particular issues.104 More recently, some scholars have
expanded this line of inquiry to study decision-making at lower federal 
courts, with many finding that ideology pervades judicial decision-making
on certain issues.105 These scholars theorize that Democrats tend to favor a
liberal outcome while Republicans tend to favor a conservative outcome.106 
Some scholars and judges have raised concerns about ascribing so much
importance to ideology, arguing instead that formalist interpretations of law 
or institutional goals, such as career advancement or general feelings of 
collegiality, motivate decisions more than ideology.107 Whatever the case, the
number of empirical studies of how judicial ideology impacts judicial 
decision-making has skyrocketed over the last decade.108 
104. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 86 (2002) (“The [attitudinal] model holds that the Supreme Court
decides disputes in light of the facts of the case vis-à-vis the ideological attitudes and values of the 
justices.”).
105. See Cass R. Sunstein et al., Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary 
Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301, 304-05 (2004) [hereinafter Sunstein et al., Ideological Voting on 
Federal Courts of Appeals]; Yung, Judged by the Company You Keep, supra note 10, at 1178-80 (finding
that liberal ideology scores are associated with an increased tendency to favor the plaintiff in civil rights 
cases); Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judicial Ideology and the Transformation of Voting Rights
Jurisprudence, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1493, 1533-36 (2008) (finding panel effects on the basis of ideology
and race in voting rights cases); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness
Review, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 784-89 (2008) (finding panel effects in Supreme Court and circuit courts
deciding arbitrariness review of EPA and NLRB decisions); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do
Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 854-59
(2006) (finding panel effects when circuit courts apply Chevron) [hereinafter Miles & Sunstein, Do Judges
Make Regulatory Policy?]; Christopher Smith, Polarized Circuits: Party Affiliation of Appointing
Presidents, Ideology, and Circuit Court Voting in Race and Gender Cases, 22 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J.
157, 174-79 (2011) (finding panel effects in race and gender cases).
106. See e.g., FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS 19 (2007)
(“[R]esearchers have presumed that judges appointed by Democrats are ideologically liberal whereas
those appointed by Republicans are ideologically conservative.”); Richard Revesz, Environmental
Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1728 (1997) (setting forth hypotheses 
about the role of ideology in impacting judicial votes in environmental cases).
107. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L.
REV. 1335, 1336-39 (1998); see also RICHARD J. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 29 (2008); Harry T.
Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies that Attempt to Understand the Factors
Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895, 1904-06 (2009); Harry T. Edwards, The Effects
of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1639, 1656 (2003) [hereinafter Edwards, 
The Effects of Collegiality]; Harry T. Edwards, Public Misconceptions Concerning the “Politics” of 
Judging: Dispelling Some Myths about the D.C. Circuit, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 619, 625 (1985).
108. A special symposium of the Duke Law Journal addressed this blossoming literature. See, e.g., 
Jeffrey M. Chemerinsky & Jonathan L. Williams, Measuring Judges and Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1173 
(2009); Frank B. Cross & Stefanie Lindquist, Judging the Judges, 58 DUKE L.J. 1383 (2009); Jack Knight, 
Are Empiricists Asking the Right Questions about Judicial Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1531 (2009);
see also Joshua B. Fischman & David S. Law, What is Judicial Ideology and How Should We Measure 
It?, 29 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 133 (2009); Tonja Jacobi & Matthew Sag, Taking the Measure of Ideology: 
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Scholars theorize that panel composition impacts judicial outcomes,
with many finding that the partisan affiliation of one’s colleagues impacts 
vote choice and may mitigate (or enhance) the impact of a judge’s own
ideology.109 In two seminal works, Richard Revesz (studying the D.C.
Circuit)110 and Cass Sunstein et al. (studying federal circuit courts on a host 
of issues),111 found that the propensity of a member of a three-judge panel to
cast a liberal vote increases with every Democratic appointee on the bench,
and likewise decreases with every Republican appointee.112 Indeed, Revesz
notes that “while individual voting and panel composition both have
important effects on a judge’s vote, the ideology of one’s colleagues is a 
better predictor of one’s vote than one’s own ideology.”113 The differences 
can be striking: Sunstein et al. found that in some areas of law, such as 
affirmative action, an all-Democratic panel issued a liberal ruling 82% of the
time while an all-Republican panel did so only 37% of the time.114 Other
scholars have found similar results in diverse areas of law, including asylum 
cases;115 criminal, immigration, and civil rights cases;116 and Establishment 
Clause cases in the federal courts of appeals.117 These so-called “panel 
effects” apply not just to partisanship but to gender, race and religion as well, 
with judges deciding a case differently depending on the gender and race of
Empirically Measuring Supreme Court Cases, 98 GEO. L.J. 1 (2009); Gregory C. Sisk, The Quantitative 
Moment and the Qualitative Opportunity: Legal Studies of Judicial Decision Making, 93 CORNELL L.
REV. 873 (2008).
109. See Revesz, supra note 106, at 1732; see also CASS SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL?
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (Brookings Inst. 2006) (analyzing panel effects in 
the federal judiciary); Cox & Miles, supra note 105, at 1533-36 (finding panel effects on the basis of 
ideology and race in voting rights cases); Thomas J. Miles, The Law’s Delay: A Test of the Mechanisms 
of Judicial Peer Effects, 4. J. OF LEGAL ANALYSIS 301, 310 (2012) (analyzing panel effects).
110. Revesz, supra note 106.
111. SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 109.
112. Sunstein et al. note that this occurs because “[d]eliberating groups of like-minded people tend 
to go to extremes.” Id. at 71.
113. Revesz, supra note 106, at 1764.
114.  Sunstein et al., Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals, supra note 105, at 319.
115. See Joshua B. Fischman, Estimating Preferences of Circuit Judges: A Model of Consensus 
Voting, 54 J. LAW & ECON. 781, 792 (2011). Fischman finds that Democratic appointees grant relief 35%
of the time to plaintiffs in asylum cases when his co-panelists are Democrats compared to just 15% when
he shares the bench with two Republicans. Id. at 793. Likewise, Republican appointees favor the asylum
plaintiff 20% of the time when sitting with two Democrats but just 6% of the time when sitting with co-
partisans. Id.
116. See Carlos Berdejó, It’s the Journey, Not the Destination: Judicial Preferences and the 
Decision-Making Process, 51 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 271, 275 (2013) (finding that plaintiffs in criminal 
and immigration cases prevail less when Democrats are on the panel, but that the chance of success in 
civil rights and prisoner petition cases increases when more Democrats are on the panel).
117. See Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Ideology “All the Way Down”? An Empirical Study of
Establishment Clause Decisions in the Federal Courts, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1201, 1216 (2012) (finding
that Democratic-appointed judges uphold Establishment Clause challenges 57% of the time, while
Republican-appointed judges do so only 25% of the time, resulting in a 2.25 times greater chance of 
prevailing before a Democratic-appointed judge).
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242 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW Vol. 37:2
his or her co-panelists.118 Adam Cox and Thomas Miles, for instance, found 
that African-American judges were twice as likely as white judges to find a 
violation of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.119 However, other studies 
have found no evidence of judges voting ideologically in other areas of law. 
For instance, Jonathan Remy Nash and Rafael Pardo found that only non-
ideological factors motivated decision-making in bankruptcy cases at the
court of appeals.120 
Sunstein et al. set forth theories of ideological dampening and 
ideological amplification.121 Ideological dampening occurs when the
propensity for a judge to favor his own ideology is “dampened” if his co-
panelists come from the opposing party.122 This may be because judges are 
persuaded by opposing viewpoints, or it could be a byproduct of
collegiality.123 Judges may suppress doubts in order to go along with other 
members of the panel,124 or alternatively, the views of co-panelists may play
a role in moderating the tone of the majority’s legal reasoning. In another 
variant of the model, the lone minority judge on a three-judge panel acts as a 
whistleblower.125 Where the majority may deviate from precedent, the lone 
minority judge can threaten to “blow the whistle” by writing a dissent so as 
to make the appellate court cognizant of the panel’s break with precedent.126 
118. See, e.g., Christina L. Boyd, Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Untangling the Causal Effects
of Sex on Judging, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 389, 390, 402-06 (2010) (finding gender panel effects in cases
implicating sex discrimination); Sean Farhang & Gregory Wawro, Institutional Dynamics on the U.S. 
Court of Appeals: Minority Representation Under Panel Decision Making, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 299,
320 (2004) (finding that a woman being on the panel results in the men on the panel voting more
“liberally”); Jonathan P. Kastellec, Racial Diversity and Judicial Influence on Appellate Courts, AM. J.
POL. SCI. 167, 178 (2012) (finding that the presence of a nonwhite panelist increases the propensity of the 
panel voting in favor of affirmative action policies); Jennifer L. Peresie, Female Judges Matter: Gender 
and Collegial Decisionmaking in the Federal Appellate Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1759, 1787 (2005) (finding 
gender differences in judging in sexual discrimination cases); DANIEL R. PINELLO, GAY RIGHTS AND 
AMERICAN LAW 87-91 (2003) (reporting religious effects in gay rights cases).
119. Cox & Miles, supra note 105, at 1535-36. Similarly, they found that Democratic appointees
were more likely than Republican appointees to find a violation. Id. at 1531-35.
120. Jonathan Remy Nash and Rafael I. Pardo, Does Ideology Matter in Bankruptcy? Voting 
Behavior on the Courts of Appeals, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 919, 923-24 (2012).
121. See Sunstein et al., Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals, supra note 105, at 304-
05.
122. Id. at 304-05. Indeed, in some areas of law, Sunstein et al. found such extreme cases of
ideological dampening (which they called “leveling effects”) such that Democratic judges, sitting with
two Republican judges, are as likely to vote in a conservative direction as Republican judges sitting with
two Democratic colleagues. Id. at 305.
123. Id. at 307.
124. Id. Sunstein et al. refers to this phenomenon as the “collegial concurrence” where a judge would 
rather just agree with the majority opinion rather than waste the time to dissent. Id.  
125. See Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal 
Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2159 (1998); Jonathan 
P. Kastellec, Panel Composition and Judicial Compliance on the US Court of Appeals, 23 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 421, 421-41 (2007).
126. See Cross & Tiller, supra note 125, at 2159.
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This threat results in the majority issuing a more moderate opinion than it 
would have otherwise because it does not want to be reversed by the higher
court.127 Judges may also not want to spend the time to write a dissent.128 
“Dissent aversion” may also be at work, with one judge having a particularly
strong opinion, and at least one of the other two judges goes along with the
first judge to “avoid creating ill will.”129 They may also engage in logrolling 
by trading a vote on one issue in exchange for a favorable vote on another.130 
Likewise, a judge’s ideological tendency may be “amplified” if he sits 
with co-partisans.131 Sunstein et al. notes that this occurs because
“[d]eliberating groups of like-minded people tend to go to extremes.”132 The 
pool of arguments employed by a homogenous group will likely be very 
different than those employed by a mixed group.133 For instance, in an all-
Democratic panel, panelists will offer arguments in favor of the liberal
outcomes, whereas, on a mixed panel, members from the other party may
raise contrasting arguments that favor a more conservative outcome.134 
Judges, for instance, may be exposed to and respond to the most extreme
argument of the group.135 Judges sitting with their co-partisans may also have
greater confidence that their viewpoints are correct.136 
While there has been a robust literature on the study of panel effects on
federal courts of appeals, there has been virtually no empirical study of how 
panel voting works in administrative agencies.137 Analyzing panel effects at
administrative agencies is important for understanding how the agencies
function and exercise delegated power—particularly given how commonly 
administrative agencies decide cases using a panel format. We now turn to 
this task using the NLRB as a case study. Using the backdrop of the panel 
127. See id.
128. See id. at 2174. Cross and Tiller argue that the presence of a minority viewpoint could alter the 
content of the opinion even if there is not a formal dissent. Id. at 2159.
129. Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Why (and When) Judges Dissent: A 
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 3 J. OF LEGAL ANALYSIS 101, 108 (2011).
130. See Peresie, supra note 118, at 1785. However, although judges may care more about some
cases than others, “explicit vote trading” is not permitted. Evan H. Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting 
Norms on Multimember Courts, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2297, 2380 (1999) (“One apparent ‘rule of the game’
of collegial judges is that, while certain forms of output-focused strategic behavior are accepted (even 
encouraged) and others are quietly tolerated, explicit vote is disallowed.”).
131. Ideological amplification in many areas of law is so strong such that Democrats sitting with
two other Democrats are about twice as likely to vote in a liberal direction as are Republicans sitting with
Republican judges. See SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 109, at 10. 
132. Id. at 71.
133. See id. at 76.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See id. at 75.
137. But see Christopher L. Griffin, Identifying Panel Effects in Quasi-Judicial Decision Making
(May 15, 2015) (unpublished paper presented to the 25th Annual American Law and Economics
Association Annual Meeting, Columbia Law School) (on file with author).
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244 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW Vol. 37:2
effects literature, we look to see how panel effects apply in administrative 
adjudication.
B. Design of the Empirical Study 
Applied to the NLRB, I test the following four hypotheses:
1. Democratic panels are more likely to rule in favor of labor 
when there are more Democrats on the panel (DDD>DD>D);
2. Democratic panels are less likely to rule in favor of industry 
when there are more Democrats on the panel (DDD<DD<D);
3. Republican panels are more likely to rule in favor of industry 
when there are more Republicans on the panel (RRR>RR>R);
4. Republican panels are less likely to rule in favor of labor when 
there are more Republicans on the panel (RRR<RR<R). 
To analyze the NLRB of the Clinton and Bush II presidencies and to see
whether it acts consistently with its principal founding purpose of being an
impartial “labor court,” I looked at 2,675 NLRB cases from 1993 to 2007, 
spanning the Clinton and second Bush administrations.138 This sample 
contains a large variety of data over two presidential administrations, yet does 
not span such long a period that omitted variables concerning time trends 
cloud the analysis. The status of labor remained largely unchanged during
this period; Congress has passed no major labor laws since the 1950s139 and
it appears unlikely to do so anytime in the future.140 President Clinton had the 
unique opportunity to be able to transition the Board to Democratic control 
and appoint a General Counsel in his first year in office.141 President Bush 
138. I deliberately excluded cases from 2008 because during parts of that year the Board operated
with only two members, raising legal issues concerning the constitutionality of two-member panels and 
whether such panels constituted a quorum. The circuit courts were divided on whether to accept the
NLRB’s two-member rulings as valid. See, e.g., John Sanchez, The National Labor Relations Board at
75: Two is Company but it is a Quorum?, 51 FLA. INT’L L. REV. 715, 717 (2010). The Court ultimately
resolved these issues. See supra text accompanying note 4; New Process Steel, L.P. v. N.L.R.B., 560 U.S.
674 (2010).
139. See Landrum-Griffin Act, supra note 19; Brudney, supra note 36, at 228. Congress last passed
a labor law in 1959 making some changes, among others, such as revising some of the provisions directed
against union abuses. See id. Congress also added amendments in 1974 directed toward the healthcare 
industry. Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395 (1974). Subsequent attempts to pass labor law reform have 
failed. See Labor Law Reform Act of 1977, H.R. 8410, 95th Cong. (1977); S. 1883, 95th Cong. (1977);
Teamwork for Employees and Managers Act, S. 295, 104th Cong. (1994).
140. As Cynthia Estlund notes, “[A] longstanding political impasse at the national level has blocked
any major congressional revision of the basic text since at least 1959.” Cynthia L. Estlund, The
Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1530 (2002).
141. See Ellen J. Dannin, We Can’t Overcome?: A Case Study of Freedom of Contract and Labor
Law Reform, 16 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 3 n.10. Furthermore, because the General Counsel serves 
a four-year term, the President often does not have the opportunity to appoint a new General Counsel until 


















    
 
       
 
   
  
 
    
  




     
  
  




 2452016 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
faced more obstacles in his effort to transition the Board to Republican 
control. Indeed, it was not until early 2002 that a majority of the Board’s
members were Republican.142 
I collected the cases in a few different ways. The NLRB hears two types 
of cases: unfair labor dispute cases and election representation cases.143 I 
limited the analysis to unfair labor disputes because assessing whether the 
Board member favors labor or not is easier to decipher.144 First, I looked up 
all the NLRB’s cases on the LexisNexis database by year for the period. I 
read each case and coded the cases in several different ways. I first coded the
cases for case outcomes, generating a “1” if the case was decided in favor of 
labor and a “0” otherwise. For any case brought against an employer (a “CA” 
case), I counted the case as “pro-labor” if the Board decided any part of the 
case on the merits in labor’s favor. For any case brought against a union (a
“CB,” “CC,” or “CD” case) I counted the case as “pro-labor” if the Board 
decided for the union.145 For any case brought by an employee, I coded the 
case as “pro-industry” if the Board decided the case for the employer. Finally,
for any case brought by an employee against a union, I coded the case as
“pro-industry” if the Board decided against the union.
In just 8% of the cases in my database, employees or others brought
complaints against unions (“CB” cases); the vast majority of cases were
brought by employees or unions against employers (“CA” cases).146 Figure 1
the second year of his presidency—unless the General Counsel retires early (as happened during President 
Clinton’s presidency).
142. Turner, supra note 8, at 74 (setting forth in Appendix a list of all Board members, their parties
and employment background).
143. The Board hears unfair labor cases pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 160. It also hears representation 
election cases under 29 U.S.C. § 159 (c)(1)(A)(i)-(ii) (2012), which involve a determination of the
particular union that an employee groups wants to represent them (certification proceeding) or a
determination of whether a union that the Board previously certified still represents them (decertification
proceeding). 
144. Moreover, much of the empirical literature on the NLRB concerns unfair labor practice dispute
cases. See sources cited supra note 8.
145. CA cases are based on violations of sections 8(a)(1)-8(a)(5) of the NLRA; CB cases allege
violations of sections 8(b)(1)(A) through 8(b)(6); CC cases allege violations of sections 8(b)(4)(ii) through 
subparts (A) and (C); and CD cases allege violations under section 8(b)(4)(i). I eliminated cases
concerning violations under CP for violation of sections 8(b)(7)(A) through 8(b)(7)(C) because there were 
only a few cases. I also eliminated CE cases under section 8(e) because in these “Hot Embargo” cases, 
both the employer and union are defendants. For brevity, I call CB, CC and CD cases “CB” cases. 
146. The figure is from my own analysis of my database. I excluded settlements from the analysis.
Excluding settlements from the analysis could potentially raise concerns of selection bias. As Theodore
Eisenberg and Charlotte Lanvers found, however, there appears to be no evidence of a material change in 
aggregate settlement rates over time. See Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What Is the Settlement
Rate and Why Should We Care?, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111, 111 (2009). For instance, if I sought 
to test the propensity of labor to prevail before the Board, excluding settlements from the dataset could 
bring about misleading results. However, I seek to test the impact that ideology and panel configuration 
have on how the panel or individual judges will vote. Other scholars doing similar analyses have likewise
excluded settlements from the dataset. See, e.g., Taratoot, Review of Administrative Law Judge Decisions, 
supra note 8. In many cases, information on settlements is not readily available. Moreover, as Daniel
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246 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW Vol. 37:2
below details the case process. Those who feel aggrieved by an employer or 
union can file charges with the regional office of the NLRB; the NLRB
General Counsel, acting through the regional offices,147 decides whether to 
press claims as it is his responsibility to both issue and prosecute unfair labor
practice disputes.148 If a complaint is issued,149 and assuming the case does
not settle, an ALJ may hear the case.150 The losing litigant can challenge the
ALJ decision by filing within a specified time frame what is known as an 
“exception” to the ALJ’s order, which will then be heard by the Board.151 The
Board sits in panels of three members, except when it chooses to take cases
to be heard by the full five-member Board.152 Each Board member is
appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, for
five-year terms for which the member can be reappointed.153 A Board
Klerman and Yoon-Ho Alex Lee argue, one can still make valid inferences while excluding settlement
data. See Daniel Klerman & Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, Inferences from Litigated Cases, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 209,
209 (2014).
147. Description of NLRB Organization, § 203, 1 LAB. L. REP. (CCH) ¶ 1105.030, at 2965 (1985). 
All told, the Agency currently operates through twenty-six regional offices scattered throughout the 
United States. See  NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, REGIONAL OFFICES, www.nlrb.gov/who-we-
are/regional-offices (last visited Aug. 10, 2016).
148. 62 NLRB ANN. REP. 3 (1997). The General Counsel’s discretion to follow through on a 
complaint is unreviewable. N.L.R.B. v. United Food and Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, 484 U.S.
112, 114 (1987). The NLRB is unique among federal administrative agencies, as it is one of the only
agencies where the prosecutorial body is separate from the adjudicatory body. The General Counsel, who 
is appointed by the President, has the authority to issue complaints independent of the political inclinations
of the Board. Christy Concannon, Comment, The EAJA and the NLRB: Chilling the General Counsel’s 
Prerogative to Issue Unfair Labor Practice Complaints?, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 175, 177 (1986). This
change was made by Congress in 1947 because there had been the perception that the Board leaned too 
pro-labor in its rulings. E.g., Scher, supra note 8, at 332-33; John E. Higgins, Jr., Keeping Women in the
Kitchen: The Purpose and Effects of the Administrative Changes Made by Taft-Hartley, 47 CATH. U. L.
REV. 941, 960 (1998).
149. The General Counsel’s decision whether or not to issue a complaint is subject to a 
reasonableness standard. That is, the legislative history of the governing statute instructs the General
Counsel to issue a complaint if there is reasonable cause to believe that an unfair labor practice is true. 
See H.R. REP. NO. 80-245, at 40 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 292, 331 (1948); Concannon, supra note 148, at 180.
150. As a technical matter, the regional officer first determines whether the Agency has jurisdiction 
by assessing whether the claim affects interstate commerce. 29 C.F.R. § 102.63(b)(1)(i) (2016). The 
regional officer assigns a field agent to investigate the claim and to decide whether the General Counsel 
should issue a complaint. See 29 C.F.R. § 102.15 (2016). If a complaint is issued, the ALJ schedules a 
formal hearing. 29 C.F.R. § 102.34 (2016).
151. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c). The General Counsel can also file exceptions to a case. If the General 
Counsel declines to issue a complaint, the complaining party can appeal. 29 C.F.R. § 102.19 (2016).
152. In order to hear more cases, the Board typically sits in panels of three or five members. S. REP.
NO. 105, on S. 1126, reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS ACT 1947, at 414 (1948); 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (“The Board is authorized to delegate to any 
group of three or more members any or all of the powers which it may itself exercise.”); see also John E.
Higgins, Jr., THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 42 (2012) (noting that the Taft-Hartley Act changed the Board
from a three-member Board to a five-member Board).
153.  29 U.S.C. §§ 153(a), 154(a). 
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decision can be appealed to the appellate courts.154 A Board decision is 
largely “vested with a large amount of discretion [by the appellate courts],
and it will not be disturbed unless . . . the Board’s determination was lacking 
in evidentiary support, arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion.”155 As 
one scholar noted, the NLRB is probably one of the most protected agencies
with respect to whether the appellate court will disturb its rulings on appeal.156 
154.  29 U.S.C. § 160(f).
155. See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Episcopal Community of St. Petersburg, 726 F.2d 1537, 1541 (11th Cir. 
1984) (citing Ford Motor Co. v. N.L.R.B., 441 U.S. 488, 497 (1979)); Automobile Salesman’s Union 
Local 1095 v. N.L.R.B., 711 F.2d 383, 385-86 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
156. See Robert Douglas Brownstone, The National Labor Relations Board at 50: Politicization
Creates Crisis, 52 BROOK. L. REV. 229, 246 (1986).
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Figure 1: The NLRB Review Process
Source: NLRB, www.NLRB.gov.
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Figure 2 
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The figures above present graphs showing the percentage of cases 
decided in favor of labor by year. On average, as shown in Figure 2, the 
NLRB decides about 75% of the cases it hears in favor of labor each year. 
This number stayed fairly constant through the period under study. However, 
there were some notable exceptions. For instance, during the first full year of 
the Bush II presidency, in 2002, the Board decided only between 53% and 
57% of cases in favor of labor, depending on how one codes the variable. 
This lower rate in 2002 is not altogether surprising. It generally takes about 
two years for the NLRB to hear the appeal of an ALJ decision.157 As a result,
decisions heard by the ALJ in 2000 before the presidential election may just
be coming up before the Board in 2002, so the case mix for that particular 
year may have been different. More importantly for this study, panels 
composed exclusively of Republicans heard almost 10% of the cases in
2002—the highest yearly total for the entire period under study.158 In 
157. See Samuel Estreicher, Improving the Administration of the National Labor Relations Act 
Without Statutory Change, 5 FLA. INT’L U. L. REV. 361, 372 (2010).
158. Indeed, less than 1% of the cases were heard by panels exclusively composed of Republicans 
in my database. A quarter of those cases were in 2002.
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addition, about 91% of cases had a pro-labor bent in 1996. Like the anomaly 
of 2002, this exception to the general trend is most likely attributable to the 
change in presidential administration. By 1996, President Clinton finally had 
the opportunity to mold the NLRB more in his favor. Given that there is some 
lag time between the ALJ decision and that of the Board, it is unsurprising 
that perhaps it took a few years for the more liberal spirit of the Clinton
administration to pervade the NLRB as well. 
To help narrow down the cases (and to also check my coding to ensure
inter-coder reliability), I also consulted with two databases I received from 
the NLRB that were not readily accessible until recently.159 Between 1984 
and 2000, the NLRB hosted its cases in the Case Handling Information 
Processing System (“CHIPS”), and from 1999 to 2010, it collected cases in
the Case Activity Tracking System (“CATS”).160 Each database, particularly 
the CATS database, has a treasure trove of information for scholars to study
agency adjudication.161 I used the database to give me further information on 
the identity of the parties and to confirm my coding of information.162 
In addition, I omitted certain types of Board decisions that could have 
distorted my analysis. First of all, I excluded Board decisions that merely 
159. The CHIPS database is available at www.data.gov and the CATS database is available at 
www.archives.gov. See U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, OFFICE OF CITIZEN SERVICES AND
INNOVATIVE TECHNOLOGIES, www.data.gov (last visited Sept. 15, 2015); THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES, 
www.archives.gov (last visited Sept. 15, 2015).
160. Consistent with the methodology of other scholars, I rely in this analysis on published decisions
available on LexisNexis. However, my analysis was complicated because the CHIPS and CATS databases
track case outcomes by actual case numbers. For instance, a few challengers may contest employer action 
and the cases may all be combined at some point for the Board to hear the cases jointly. 
161. The CATS database alone contains over 600 fields and more than 50 Excel spreadsheets of
information on everything the Agency does in its adjudication, ranging from how many cases are 
withdrawn to a regional breakdown of cases. See supra note 159.
162. I did two things to ensure some measure of reliability with respect to the cases I collected from 
LexisNexis. The NLRB’s CHIPS and CATS databases state the final outcome of the case at both the
Board and ALJ level. See supra note 159. By looking at the type of case (e.g., CA or CB) as well as the
direction of the lower court decision, I could characterize a case as pro- or anti-labor. Thus, I had an 
entirely separate database to ensure that my coding agreed with the Agency’s databases. I found that the
Agency did not always correctly transcribe the final outcome of the case; in those instances, I relied on 
my own reading of the case. Moreover, I also obtained access to a database constructed by Cole Taratoot 
where, as part of a National Science Foundation Grant, he characterizes cases as for or against labor.
However, his database does not include all cases or all years. I added several hundred additional cases
from LexisNexis that were not in his database. For the cases that his database included, I compared my
codings to see if they coincided, and where they did not, I read the case again to confirm my decision.
Sometimes, I departed from his codings because, when I assessed whether or not to code a case as “pro-
labor” or “pro-industry,” I looked at who challenged the ALJ action. For instance, if only an employer 
filed exceptions to the NLRB case and the employer won, I coded the case as anti-labor, whereas Taratoot 
often characterized such cases as split. I considered such cases wholly in favor of labor because the Board
was not asked to rule for the labor party; only the employers challenged the action, so if the Board ruled
against the employer, I considered that a case decided wholly in favor of labor. Nonetheless, I looked at 
the cases both ways and came to consistent statistical results no matter how they were coded. Furthermore,
I also excluded some cases that Taratoot included. For instance, I excluded cases dealing with procedural
or jurisdictional matters that did not really raise unfair labor dispute issues.
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bless settlement agreements. Because Board decisions are not self-enforcing, 
a Board order is necessary to compel a settling party to follow through with 
the terms of any settlement.163 The Board also hears a fair share of
supplemental decisions after the Board remands a case back to the ALJ to 
decide a factual issue.164 Since such decisions may reflect ex-post judicial 
influence, they could bias the results.165 Upon hearing the case a second time,
the ALJ may have the opportunity to correct deficiencies in his or her 
reasoning.166 Thus, I only included such cases if the Board actually ruled on 
the merits for the first time. I also excluded motions for summary judgment. 
Motions for summary judgment require the fact-finder to decide whether or 
not there is any genuine issue of material fact, so the legal issue involved is 
quite different from whether or not there is a violation of the NLRA.167 
Further, for ease of analysis, I also eliminated cases decided by the five-
member NLRB during the study’s time period. Although three-member 
panels normally hear NLRB cases, the full five-member Board often chooses 
to hear those cases posing particularly important legal issues, much like an 
en banc court of appeals.168 I also excluded cases that are both CA (against 
employers) and CB (against unions), as it is impossible to discern one single 
pro-labor or pro-industry tendency as these cases involve both issues. Finally,
I excluded some cases in which the Board does not rule on the underlying
unfair labor practice disputes. On some occasions, the Board decides a case
on technical or constitutional grounds, such as whether or not the complaint 
is time-barred or whether or not First Amendment rights are at issue or
whether the Board appropriately should exercise jurisdiction in a given 
case.169 I was then left with about 2,675 cases to analyze on the merits. 
The key independent variable of interest is the Board outcome. I coded 
the Board’s decision in a number of alternative ways. In one coding style
163. Specifically, the General Counsel must seek enforcement in the courts of appeals under section 
10(e) or by filing a cross-petition for enforcement when the losing litigant appeals to the circuit court on 
the merits of the case under section 10(f). 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)-(f) (2012). 
164. Many of the supplemental decisions concerns disputes about the remedy. See, e.g., Grosvenor
Orlando Associates, Ltd., et al., 350 N.L.R.B. 86 (2007) (ruling on backpay remedy). 
165. See Taratoot, Review of Administrative Law Judge Decisions, supra note 8, at 557.
166. See id.
167. The Board will only grant motions for summary judgment if there is “no genuine issue as to
any material fact” and “the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Conoco Chemicals
Co., 275 N.L.R.B. 39, 40 (1985).
168. See 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (“The Board is authorized to delegate to any group of three or more 
members any or all of the powers it may exercise itself”). According to my data, the Board hears less than
a dozen cases a year in the full five-member Board.
169. See, e.g., San Manuel Indian Bingo and Casino et al., 341 N.L.R.B. 138 (2004) (deciding
whether the NLRA’s jurisdiction extends to Native American reservations); Media General Operations,
Inc., et al., 346 N.L.R.B. 11 (2005) (ruling on whether the complaint is time-barred under the NLRA).
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(“Coding Style 1”), I read and analyzed each Board decision and coded the 
case as “1” if the NLRB decided the case in whole or in part in favor of labor. 
In an alternative coding (“Coding Style 2”), I looked at what party challenged 
the ALJ’s ruling in order to weigh whether the decision should be coded a 
“1” or a “0.” For instance, suppose in a case the ALJ decides in part in favor
of labor. The losing pro-labor litigant, disappointed that the ALJ did not
decide wholly in his favor, files exceptions to the ALJ’s decision. The Board 
finds those exceptions to be without merit. Under the first coding style, the 
decision would be coded as pro-labor because by affirming the ALJ decision
in part, the case upheld the pro-labor claims in part. Under Coding Style 2, 
however, a case such as this would be coded as pro-industry because the pro-
labor litigant who filed exceptions before the Board lost. In other words, the
Board found against the pro-labor litigant, and in turn, the tone of its ruling 
had a pro-industry beat because it was against labor. The Board was asked
to rule on the pro-labor litigants’ claim and it rejected them, making the
employer/industry party the “winner” of the case.
Most cases in the dataset are clear cut; the ALJ decided a case wholly in 
favor of labor and the Board upheld, often issuing merely a summary opinion 
stating that it does not have the power to review credibility determinations of 
the ALJ. However, there are a handful of cases that present the situation 
posed above, so I analyze the cases in two ways: one using the first coding 
style that favors labor, and the other using a second coding style that looks 
more carefully at the Board decision to see (i) who exactly files exceptions
to the ALJ’s ruling and (ii) whether the Board denies or grants the relief asked
for by the exceptions in whole or in part. 
As another alternative dependent variable (which I explore later with an 
alternative statistical analysis), I also look at the cases broken down more 
fine-tuned as to whether they lean labor or industry. Many cases in the dataset
are split. For instance, in a hypothetical case the charging party could 
potentially bring charges under various sections of the NLRA. Typically, pro-
labor litigants allege joint violations of section 8(a)(1) and section 8(a)(3), or 
section 8(a)(1) and section 8(a)(5), for instance The ALJ could find in favor
of the pro-labor litigant on the section 8(a)(1) claim but for the industry 
litigant on the section 8(a)(5) charge. Likewise, the Board may find the 
opposite: that there are no section 8(a)(1) violations, but there is a section 
8(a)(5) violation. There are countless possibilities. In particular, many cases 
allege specific violations against many different individual employees, each 
of which could constitute a violation of some part of the statute.170 The Board 
could find violations for some individuals, but not for others. 
170. See, e.g., Michael’s Painting, Inc., et al., 337 N.L.R.B. 140 (2002) (alleging multiple violations
concerning terminations of five people).
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Given so much potential variation in the cases, I use an alternative 
dependent variable to try to allocate each case as much as possible to one of 
four possible categories: pro-industry, lean industry, lean labor, and pro-
labor. I allocate cases to each category using the two distinct coding schemes
of Coding Style 1 and Coding Style 2 through which I look at which parties 
file exceptions to the ALJ action. Coding of the cases is necessarily
complicated and requires delicate judgment calls to properly categorize the
case. Nonetheless, nearly all of the prior empirical work on the NLRB blindly 
allocates NLRB cases to the pro-labor pile regardless of what party 
challenges the case or whether the case is split.171 With rare exceptions, no 
one has even really looked at the differences between split and non-split
cases, partly because the coding of so many cases is so laborious.172 
Moreover, scholars disagree on how exactly to code for legal doctrine. As 
Derek Linkous and Emerson Tiller note, “Doctrine . . . is hard to code for, 
and undoubtedly, there may be issues with trying to transform a legal 
principle, standard, or rule into a codable variable.”173 This study is at least a
modest attempt to try to incorporate these differences into the analysis. 
At first glance, looking at the overall data, additional Democrats on a 
panel increases the chance the NLRB will rule in favor of labor. Quite clearly,
at least on a superficial level before additional “controls” are added in, the 
partisan composition of a panel is strongly correlated with case outcomes. 
While the incremental difference is relatively small, there is a stark difference
when one compares all-Democratic panels with all-Republican panels. Using
Coding Style 1 and as shown in Figure 3, Board members sitting on all-
Democratic panels vote 91% in favor of labor, while Republican members 
entirely sitting with other Republicans vote in favor of labor only 51% of the 
time. The propensity for the Board to rule in favor of labor decreases as more
Republicans are added to the panel; when one Republican replaces a
Democrat, the Board rules in favor of labor 84% of the time—an 7% decline. 
Likewise, if two Republicans sit on a panel, the rate goes down even lower 
to 76%. The trends were similar when I switched to Coding Style 2, where I 
allocated more decisions to the pro-industry side after reading the case
specifics. Most notable is the difference with respect to all-Republican 
panels. Whereas DDR panels voted in favor of labor 80% of the time, RRD
panels voted in favor of labor 66% of the time. Likewise, whereas all-
Republican panels voted in favor of labor in whole or in part 50% of the time 
171. See, e.g., Delorme et al., supra note 8, at 208; Moe, supra note 8, at 1113.
172. But see Taratoot, Review of Administrative Law Judge Decisions, supra note 8, at 559-60; 
Cooke & Gautschi, supra note 8, at 541-42.
173. Derek J. Linkous & Emerson H. Tiller, Response, Panel Effects, Whistleblowing Theory, and
the Role of Legal Doctrine, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 83, 90-91 (2009).
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using Coding Style 1, they voted in a pro-labor direction only 26% of the 
time using Coding Style 2. These results underscore how important legal
considerations are in understanding how the Board makes decisions. 
Figure 3 
95% Confidence Intervals for Mean Pro Labor Vote 












































Coding Style 2 
DDD DDR RRD RRR DDD DDR RRD RRR 
Panel Type Panel Type 
We see a similar pattern when we restrict the analysis to only cases filed 
by labor or cases that allege only certain violations of the NLRA. As shown 
in Figure 4 using Coding Style 2, looking only at cases filed against 
employers (CA cases), all-Democratic panels rule in favor of labor 91% of 
the time, while majority Democratic-mixed panels rule in favor of labor 84%.
The presence of two Republicans rather than one changes the figure to 76%. 
The big jump, however, occurs when three Republicans occupy the panel,
although the situation is quite rare during the time frame under study (which
is why the error bars are so large). All-Republican panels voted in favor of 
labor only about 51% in cases alleging employer violations. The results are
similar looking at cases against unions (CB et al. cases), though because of
the sample size, the results are not statistically significant. 
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Figure 4 
95% Confidence Intervals for Mean Pro Labor Vote 













































DDD DDR RRD RRR DDD DDR RRD RRR 
Panel Type Panel Types 
These results echo what others have found concerning partisan effects
on panels.174 Here, across a range of issues, the same pattern emerges: an 
increased tendency to vote in favor of labor when there are more Democrats 
on the panel. Yet the effect of adding one Democrat to the panel is not merely
the inverse of adding one Republican. While the presence of a lone 
Republican on a majority Democrat panel results in a decreased tendency to 
favor labor, the absolute difference is less than in cases when there is a lone
Democrat added to a Republican panel. This suggests that the presence of a 
lone Democrat on an otherwise majority Republican panel may have a
somewhat greater impact in mediating the results toward labor than the 
opposite effect of adding a Republican. Although the differences between a 
DDD panel and a DDR panel are statistically significant in most cases, the
absolute magnitude of the difference generally is less than 10%. Interestingly,
other scholars studying panel effects in the courts of appeals have found just
the opposite: that DDR panels behave more differently from DDD panels 
than RRD panels from RRR panels.175 
174. See supra Part II.A. 
175. See Berdejó, supra note 116 , at 283-84.
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It is also important to consider what may be one of the most important
factors in determining how the Board will rule: the ALJ decision itself. Figure
5 presents the data broken down by the ideological tone of the ALJ decision 
using Coding Style 2. DDD and DDR panels almost unanimously vote to 
uphold the ALJ decision if the ALJ decides in favor of labor. By contrast, 
when the ALJ decides in favor of industry, DDD panels only vote to affirm
50% of the time. Like Democratic panels, RRR panels exhibit partisan
behavior; they unanimously affirm cases that are in line with their pro-
industry tendencies, but only affirm 36% of pro-labor decisions emanating 
from the ALJ when using Coding Style 2.
Figure 5 
95% Confidence Intervals for Mean Pro Labor Vote 
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Furthermore, panel effects appear to be especially prevalent when
looking at the propensity of the Board to validate or uphold the ALJ decision. 
Miles and Sunstein compared validation rates with respect to rates of liberal 
voting in a study of appellate court review of NLRB and Environmental 
Protection Agency decisions and found panel effects to be more prevalent on 
rates of liberal voting than for validation.176 That proposition finds support 
here. Using Coding Style 2, we see an interesting pattern in Figures 6 and 7 
below whereby DDR panels evidence greater validation rates than DDD
176. Miles & Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy?, supra note 105, at 870.
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panels. In contrast to Figures 3, 4 and 5, the panel effects in Figures 6 and 7 
do not appear to be as extreme and the error bars between panel types overlap, 
meaning that the differences between panel types is not statistically 
significant. Overall, majority Republican panels have a higher rate of reversal 
of liberal ALJ decisions, as nearly 34% and 15%, respectively, of RRR and 
RRD panels are reversals in a conservative direction, whereas DDD and DDR 
panels reverse in favor of industry only 5% of the time. The pattern is not as 
stark for reversals of conservative ALJ decisions. About 16% and 8% of
DDD and DDR decisions, respectively, are liberal reversals of conservative
ALJ decisions. By contrast, only 5% of RRD panels ever reverse in a liberal 
direction and no RRR panels reverse a conservative ALJ decision in whole 
or in part (granted, however, there are very few RRR panels hearing cases in 
the time frame under study). 
Figure 6 
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Figure 7177 
Board Validation of ALJ Decisions 


































Board Decision on ALJ Decision 
We see similar patterns if we look at the data in a more fine-tuned way.
Many cases result in a split verdict, with the NLRB deciding some charges
in a pro-labor direction and others in the opposing direction. Figures 8 and 9
below display the results for an alternative coding of the dependent variable 
where split decision are assigned as either “leaning” toward labor or industry 
with a higher score meaning the decision is more pro-labor. This figure uses 
the Coding Scheme 2 variable where I looked at the party challenging the
case to assess whether the case should be assigned as favoring labor or not, 
though the results are similar using Coding Style 1.178 Democratic panels 
(DDD or DDR) decide about 75% of cases wholly or in part in support of
labor. Adding a Republican to the panel decreases the probability. Even more 
remarkably, a panel composed entirely of Republicans will only rule entirely
in favor of labor 26% of the time—nearly a 44% point difference from the 
rate by which unified Democratic panels rule entirely for labor. We see a 
177. Figure 7 shows three categories: (1) reverse the ALJ decision in a conservative direction
(reverse the liberal ALJ decision and rule in favor of the employer or industry); (2) affirm the ALJ 
decision; or (3) reverse the ALJ decision in a more liberal direction (reverse the conservative ALJ decision
and rule in favor of labor).
178. The results using Coding Scheme 1 evidence the same pattern. Indeed, for Coding Scheme 1, 
the difference between DDD and RRR panels for pro-labor cases is nearly 33% (52% v. 19%).
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similar spread when we compare the likelihood of all-Republican panels 
ruling entirely against labor (46% for RRR versus 13% for DDD). With 
respect to split verdicts, the panels also evidence partisan effects. About 28% 
of RRR panels’ decisions are split decisions in favor of industry; this
compares with the 12% of industry-favored split decisions rendered by RRD 
panels and 5% of DDR panels. These patterns continue when the data is
broken down by subject matter or how the ALJ ruled. 
Figure 8 
95% Confidence Intervals for Mean Pro Labor Vote 
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Figure 9179 
Board Pro Labor Vote Using 4 Prong Labor Variable 





























I next present the statistical analysis to assess what impact, if any,
ideology and panel effects have on the Board’s tendency to favor labor.180 I 
hypothesize that the propensity to favor labor increases with each additional 
Democrat added to a panel. 
In my first analysis of the data, because the dependent variable in interest
is dichotomous (1 = pro-labor, 0 = pro-industry), I used logistic regression 
analysis to estimate an equation predicting the propensity of the Board to 
affirm the ALJ ruling in favor of labor.181 If the partisan identity of the panel
179. Figure 9 has four categories: (1) Pro I: a non-split decision entirely in favor of the 
employer/industry; (2) Lean I: a split decision which, on balance, seems to be decided more in favor of
the employer/industry than labor; (3) Lean L: a split decision which, on balance, seems to be decided more
in favor of labor than the employer/industry; and (4) Pro L: a non-split decision entirely in favor of labor. 
180. The equation is as follows: Y=β0 + β1iXi  +β2jXj+ β3kXk + ε, where β1i indicates variables
concerning political characteristics, β2j indicates variables indicating economic considerations and β3k 
indicates case-specific variables. 
181. The variable Y is a binary variable taking a value of “1” if the Board decides the case in time t
and is “0” otherwise. There are key three dummy variables of interest, DDR, RRD and RRR, taking the
value of “1” depending on the partisan configuration of the panel. The reference category is DDD. Vector
X contains other economic, political and case-specific variables that could impact the Y.
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impacts voting, I would expect the indicators on the panel variables to be 
negative, with the RRR having the largest substantive value. For purposes of 
the statistical analysis, I used the Coding Style 2 as the basis for the coding 
of the dependent variable, unless otherwise stated. The general findings are
the same irrespective of coding style. 
I measured the key independent variable of interest—partisan
ideology—in a few different ways.182 In order to test the hypotheses, I created
a variable to measure the panel’s partisan configuration.183 There are four 
combinations of panels that can occur on a three-member panel: unified 
Democratic (“DDD”), mixed with a Democratic majority (“DDR”), mixed
with a Republican majority (“RRD”), and unified Republican (“RRR”).184 
Most cases are heard by mixed panels: 51% are DDR and 40% are RRD. Just
under 1% of panels are unified Republican panels and a little under 8% are 
unified Democratic panels. Figures 10 and 11 graphically display information 
about the panel breakdown. Certain panels are only prevalent in certain years. 
During the Bush II years, for instance, we see more RRD panels, with the
opposite being true during the Clinton years. Based on the Board member’s 
political affiliation,185 I assigned each case to one of the indicated panel types
182. Scholars have debated the appropriate metric to use to measure ideology; some favor looking
to the party of the appointing President while others prefer a continuous, numerical measure. See Lee
Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 90-91 (2002). Still others measure the
ideology of Supreme Court Justices by looking to newspaper editorial content as a proxy for ideology. 
See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court 
Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557, 557 (1989); Jeffrey A. Segal et al., Ideological Values and the Votes
of Supreme Court Justices Revisited, 57 J. POL. 812, 812 (1995).
183. This figure is not based on the party of the appointing President, because presidents often 
appoint members of the opposing party. Rather, the Board members’ partisan affiliations are well known 
and advertised on the NLRB’s website. See NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, OUR HISTORY, 
www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/our-history (last visited Aug. 10, 2016); see also Turner, supra note 8, at 74
(setting forth in the Appendix the partisan identification of each Board member).
184. Although cases are apparently randomly assigned to panels, as an additional check, I examine
the direction of the lower court ALJ vote (whether in favor of labor or not) across each panel type. There
was no statistically significant difference among panel types concerning the direction of the lower court 
decision, thus suggesting there is no linkage between the type of case and the judges assigned to hear it. 
As Eisenberg et al. point out, there is a non-random aspect to all case assignments, as there could be
differences based on case specialization, seniority, or workload. See Theodore Eisenberg et al., Does the
Judge Matter? Exploiting Random Assignment on a Court of Last Resort to Assess Judge and Case
Selection Effects, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL. STUD. 246, 250-51 (2012). If assignments were not random,
questions might arise with respect to whether panels receive different pools of cases. See id. at 251. To
confirm random assignment, I regressed variables hinting at case characteristics on a dichotomous variable 
indicating the partisan composition of the panel, along with a time trend. See Berdejó, supra note 116, at 
282 (noting analysis to confirm random assignment). I also did a specification focusing in the
directionality of the lower court decision, including whether the ALJ was a Democrat or a Republican.  
185. Admittedly, measuring judicial ideology by a binary measure is crude. See Yung, Judged by
the Company You Keep, supra note 10, at 1135-36. Though some academics construct an index of judicial 
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in order to see whether panel type impacted case results for the Board overall.
A “1” signals the presence of the panel type, with all-Democratic panels as 
the reference category.
In an alternative specification, I measured the tone of the Board’s 
decision by compiling the individual ideology scores of the members present
on the deciding Board using information from the Nixon database of 
commissioner ideology.186 David Nixon measures ideology by using an
analysis similar to NOMINATE, which uses past behavior of commissioners
who served in Congress.187 Based on these scores, I calculated the average
ideology of the three-member Board hearing the case. I then created three
dummy variables for liberal, moderate, and conservative Boards.188 This 
alternative coding of the relevant dependent variable creating the panel 
variable by ideology instead of appointment did not impact the results. 
ideology using the party of the appointing President, here I use the actual party of the judge. The NLRB
makes this information public, as it advertises the judge’s political party on its website. See supra note
183. Moreover, it is customary for a judge to reappoint a member from the party of the departing member. 
See Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles, Established by Practice: The Theory and Operation of
Independent Federal Agencies¸52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1111, 1139 n.137 (2000) (“By tradition, two of the five
seats on the NLRB have been reserved for individuals who are not members of the President’s party.”).
President Clinton, for instance, appointed two Republicans to the Board. Turner, supra note 8, at 74. 
186. See David C. Nixon, Separation of Powers and Appointee Ideology, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 438, 
450 (2004) (setting forth scores). 
187. Nixon bases his scores on the ideology of the “pivotal veto override legislator” at the time of 
appointment. Id. at 450 tbl.1. Use of this measure helps avoid the endogeneity problem of using votes to
measure attitudes.
188. Some scholars, especially those in political science, prefer using this alternative way of 
measuring ideology. See, e.g., Sisk & Heise, supra note 117, at 1215.
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Figure 10
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President. The ideology of the presidential administration could impact 
case outcomes. Presidents make appointments to the Board and can choose 
the chair.189 In addition, the President can use the resources of the Office of 
Management and Budget to monitor the Board’s activities and to influence 
the Agency’s budget.190 Moe found that the President’s party is the most 
important explanation variable of the Board’s propensity to rule in favor of
labor.191 NLRB appointees serve five-year terms, and because of the 
unwritten norm that presidents reappoint members of the same party,
Republican presidents often appoint Democrats to the Board and vice 
versa.192 As such, Republican Board members might moderate their views in
advance of an upcoming election. I account for presidential administration 
by coding “1” for “Clinton” and 0 for Bush II.193 
Congress. The composition of Congress could impact how the NLRB 
rules. Indeed, studies of other federal agencies show that Congress’ acts have 
a measurable impact on agency performance.194 The congressional committee 
serves as a “gatekeeper” for when the legislature will hold hearings on an
agency or take other actions.195 Congress also holds the purse strings on the 
NLRB and can amend or repeal its governing statute.196 Moreover, 
particularly in the NLRB’s early years, Congress often held hearings in
response to what it perceived as unsuitable adjudications at the NLRB.197 
189.  29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (2012). 
190. See, e.g., Peter M. Shane, Independent Policymaking and Presidential Power: A Constitutional
Analysis, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 596, 614 (1989) (noting role of Office of Management and Budget in
approving budget requests for independent agencies).
191. Moe, supra note 8, at 1110. However, Moe found one exception to this pattern: inflation had a 
more important impact during the Nixon years than presidential party. Id.
192. See Breger & Edles, supra note 185, at 1139 n.137.  For instance, President Clinton appointed
Republicans to the Board to replace departing Republicans. Turner, supra note 8, at 74 (setting forth in
Appendix the party identifications of all Board members). 
193. In other specifications, I also employed Poole & Rosenthal’s presidential NOMINATE scores.
See KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, CONGRESS: A POLITICAL-ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ROLL 
CALL VOTING (1997). These scores fall on a continuum from -1 to 1 and are directly comparable to the 
NOMINATE scores I used to measure congressional influence. See id. at 5-6, 11-15.
194. See, e.g., Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative
Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 247-48 (1987) (discussing
Congress’ role as principal in an agency relationship); Barry R. Weingast, The Congressional-
Bureaucratic System: A Principal Agent Perspective (with Applications to the SEC), 44 PUB. CHOICE 147, 
151-58 (1984) (analyzing congressional influence over the Securities and Exchange Commission).  
195. See WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS 89 (2011).
196. See William H. Hardie III, The Independent Agency After Bowsher v. Synar – Alive and Kicking, 
40 VAND. L. REV. 903, 920 (1987).
197. Flynn, supra note 14, at 1368-1377.
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Consistent with other scholars, I use Poole & Rosenthal’s NOMINATE
scores to measure the ideology of Congress at the time of the Board 
decision.198 Following their example, I compiled the NOMINATE scores of 
the median member of both the House and Senate committees that oversee 
the NLRB.199 Agencies might be more responsive to some parts of Congress 
than others, as members of the relevant oversight subcommittee and its 
chairman exert far more influence on the agency’s day-to-day operations than 
a congressperson not on such a committee. During the time period under 
study, the ideology of the relevant House oversight committee shifted from
being fairly liberal at the beginning of the Clinton administration to being
much more conservative by the Bush II administration’s end. The 1994 
midterm elections moved the median ideology to be much more conservative 
and in the years since, the median ideology has grown more conservative
with each midterm election during the Bush administration. In the Senate,
ideology scores have fluctuated more.
Although some scholars have found that Congress impacts the NLRB’s 
voting,200 the Agency’s adjudications are unlikely to change in tune with 
partisan shifts in Congress. As a practical matter, Congress rarely exercises 
“control” over an agency. Congress hardly ever holds hearings anymore on 
the NLRB, and when Congress does hold hearings, they typically concern
the Board’s workload as opposed to its policy.201 Congress has essentially
adopted a stance of “conscious inaction” with respect to labor policy.202 In 
alternative specifications, I used a dummy variable to capture shifts in control
of congressional control. For instance, during this time frame, House control 
shifted with the 1994 election, and Senate control shifted several times, as 
previously indicated. This alternative coding of the variable did not impact 
the results. 
Judicial. The composition of the reviewing appellate court could impact 
how the NLRB will rule. Since Board decisions can be directly appealed to
the relevant circuit court of appeals, it may be the case that the circuit courts
198. See POOLE & ROSENTHAL, supra note 193, at 12-30; Taratoot, Review of Administrative Law 
Judge Decisions, supra note 8, at 561 (noting use of Poole and Rosenthal’s presidential common space
scores). Other scholars used Americans for Democratic Action scores or the AFL-CIO’s COPE scores. 
See, e.g., Moe, supra note 8, at 1100 (using Americans for Democratic Action scores); Cooke et al., supra
note 8, at 248 (using AFL-CIO C.O.P.E. scores). Use of the NOMINATE scores allows for better
comparisons between variables.
199. In the House, the Education and Workforce Committee oversees the NLRB, while in the Senate,
the Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee oversees the NLRB. In an alternative specification, 
I use the NOMINATE scores of the relevant subcommittee that oversees the actions of the NLRB instead 
of the committee. There are no discernible differences in the results. I also employed a specification where
I simply used the NOMINATE score for Congress in general at the time of the Board decision.
200. See Moe, supra note 8, at 1107, 1109 (finding that the Board’s propensity to rule in favor of 
labor is influenced by the liberalness of congressional oversight committees). 
201. Id. at 1101.
202. Brudney, supra note 36, at 227-30.
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influence how the NLRB will rule prospectively. For example, the Board 
may be more likely to uphold a liberal ALJ decision if the Board knows its 
own decision will be reviewed in a liberal circuit (e.g., Ninth Circuit) as 
opposed to a conservative circuit (e.g., Fifth Circuit). Taratoot found that the 
ideology score of the relevant reviewing court impacted how the Board will 
rule.203 Moe too found similar results and noted that courts can have a 
“potent” power in nullifying or altering Board decisions.204 Similar to 
Taratoot, I used judicial common space scores (comparable to the
NOMINATE scores discussed above) calculated on the basis of state 
congressional delegation of the President’s party consisting of the median
ideology of the relevant court of appeals in the region from which the case
emanated.205 
Yet, as with Congress, there are a few reasons why it is unlikely that the 
NLRB affirmatively considers the ideology of the courts in deciding how 
they will rule. The NLRB would have to be quite knowledgeable about the 
appellate courts. It would have to not only know in which appellate court the 
case would be heard, but also have a sense of the ideology of the judges on 
that court. With respect to the first proposition, a party appealing an NLRB 
case has a choice of forum: they can appeal to the D.C. Circuit or to the
respective regional courts of appeals where the conduct arose.206 This venue 
uncertainty makes it difficult to know a priori what circuit would likely hear 
the case at a subsequent time. Moreover, it is generally the case, depending 
on the circuit, that randomly assigned panels hear circuit court cases.207 Thus, 
it would be difficult (if not impossible) to know in advance the ideology of 
the prospective panel and how that ideology would affect the case’s outcome.
Further, only about 1% of the NLRB’s decisions are appealed.208 The NLRB 
has also embraced an affirmative policy of nonacquiescence to the federal
circuit courts: the Agency has explicitly refused to follow precedent from 
203. Taratoot, Review of Administrative Law Judge Decisions, supra note 8, at 567.
204. Moe, supra note 8, at 1101.
205. See Michael W. Giles et al., Research Note, Picking Federal Judges: A Note on Policy and
Partisan Selection Agendas, 54 POL. RES. Q. 623, 631 (2001) (calculating common space scores for
appellate judges “for the state congressional delegation of the President’s party in the year of the judge’s
appointment”). Similar to the Poole & Rosenthal scores, judicial scores ranges from -1 from most liberal 
to +1 for most conservative. These scores are highly correlated with the party of the appointing President 
(.825). See POOLE & ROSENTHAL, supra note 193, at 5-6.
206. Losing parties can seek judicial review of an adverse Board decision in the federal court where 
they can petition for relief or seek enforcement of a Board order. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)-(f) (2012). The
General Counsel can also seek enforcement of a Board order. Id. Parties can file appeals “wherein such 
person resides or conducts business” or in the D.C. Circuit. Id. § 160(f). 
207. Michael Hasdey, Ending the Reign of Slot Machine Justice, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 291, 
291 (2000). This assumption has been called into question. See Adam E. Chilton & Marin K. Levy, 
Challenging the Randomness of Panel Assignment in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 101 CORNELL L.
REV. 1, 1 (2015) (“Our results provide evidence of nonrandomness in the federal courts of appeals.”). 
208. Joan Flynn, The Costs and Benefits of “Hiding the Ball”: NLRB Policymaking and the Failure 
of Judicial Review, 75 B.U. L. REV. 387, 426 n.165 (1995).
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circuit courts contrary to NLRB precedent.209 With these various factors in
mind, it would be quite surprising if circuit courts’ ideologies turned out to
be a statistically significant variable in predicting the tone of NLRB 
decisions.210 
Unemployment Rate. The NLRB’s decisions can echo through the 
economy, and the NLRB may also react to changes in the wider economic 
environment. Although some scholars have found the unemployment rate to
coincide with votes for labor, others have found the opposite.211 Moreover, 
some scholars have suggested that unions are less active during periods of
high unemployment.212 I gathered information on the annual unemployment 
rate at the time of the Board decision from the U.S. Department of Labor’s
Bureau of Labor Statistics.213 
Rate of Inflation. 214 To measure inflation, I use the annual consumer 
price index (“CPI”) reported by the Labor Department. As with 
209. Brudney, supra note 36, at 237-38. The NLRB claims it follows this policy so as to ensure
uniform application of law throughout the country. Id. at 238. The NLRB also thinks itself to be superior
to other bodies in interpreting the labor law since it has developed expertise on the issue. Id. Furthermore, 
the NLRB contends that since losing litigants have a choice of venue it is impossible for the NLRB to 
successfully anticipate in advance how the appellate court will likely rule. Id. For more on the NLRB’s 
nonacquiescence positions, see Rebecca Hanner White, Time for a New Approach: Why the Judiciary
Should Disregard the “Law of the Circuit” When Confronting Nonacquiescence by the National Labor
Relations Board, 69 N.C. L. REV. 639 (1991); see also Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz,
Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679, 705-712 (1989).
210. In an alternative specification, I also employed the ideology of the United States Supreme Court
at the time of the Board decision. It would be quite surprising for the ideology of the Supreme Court to
have a downstream impact on the tone of the NLRB’s decisions for the simple reason that Supreme Court 
review is so remote. Moreover, the Supreme Court will rarely hear direct appeals from the appellate courts 
on NLRB cases that do not also involve broader questions concerning the administrative state generally.
See Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Defending the NLRB: Improving the Agency’s Success in the Federal Courts of 
Appeals, 5 FLA. INT’L L. REV. 437, 450 (2010). As such, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court’s
ideology appears to have no bearing on NLRB decisions.
211. See, e.g., Cooke et al., supra note 8, at 252 (finding that unemployment influences the 
propensity of the Board members ruling in favor of labor in complex cases); Moe, supra note 8, at 1109
(higher unemployment leads to more pro-labor Board decisions). But see Taratoot, Review of 
Administrative Law Judge Decisions, supra note 8, at 567 (finding inflation not to be statistically
significant).
212. See Douglas A. Hibbs, Industrial Conflict in Advanced Industrial Societies, 71 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 1033, 1057 (1976); Moe, supra note 8, at 1103.
213. See DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, www.bls.gov/ces (last visited 
Sept. 15, 2015).  In alternative specifications, I include lags for the economic variables. I also tried using 
the change in the unemployment rate from the time of the ALJ decision.
214. Others look at other economic variables such as the number of strike days. See Roomkin, supra
note 8, at 250.
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unemployment, scholars have reached differing conclusions on the impact
that inflation has on Board outcomes.215 
Ideological tone of ALJ Decision. I coded, and confirmed with the 
Agency databases, the tone of the ALJ decision in the same way as I did for 
the Board decision, coding “1” if the decision was pro-labor and 0 otherwise. 
If the ALJ ruling affirmed the Regional Officer’s decision in whole or in part, 
I awarded a “1.” The coding becomes difficult because sometimes the ALJ 
will affirm parts and dismiss parts, and sometimes, all or only part of the
Regional Officer’s decision will be appealed. Accordingly, I tried alternative 
specifications where I looked at the split cases to discern if the case is more 
or less pro-labor. Controlling for the ALJ decision in this way is important 
because the Board is largely constrained by the ALJ’s decision.216 
Case Mix. Selection effects may also be at work in Board decisions. 
Litigants may behave strategically in response to Board behavior and adjust 
their filing behavior accordingly.217 According to the famous Priest-Klein
model, if parties have perfect information, 50% of cases would be 
affirmances and 50% would be reversals because parties would settle to avoid 
other possibilities.218 Pro-labor litigants such as labor unions may believe that
a Democratic Board will be more likely to issue a favorable ruling than a 
Republican Board, and will thus wait to bring charges if it appears likely that 
the Board will soon tilt.219 Therefore, labor unions may bring more cases 
when the probability of having a Democratic Board is the greatest.220 
Litigants may also use the NLRB for “self-serving purposes”: to achieve 
delay in a union election, to commence negotiations with a union, or to
simply harass the opponent.221 
There also may be a “feedback effect” at work. In his study of the NLRB,
Moe found that the percent of labor-filed cases increases in line with both the 
regional staff’s filtering decisions and the Board’s formal decisions.222 To 
215. Compare Moe, supra note 8, at 1109 (finding that lower inflation corresponds with more pro-
labor Board decisions) with Taratoot, Review of Administrative Law Judge Decisions, supra note 8, at 567
(finding inflation to not be statistically significant).
216. See Taratoot, Review of Administrative Law Judge Decisions, supra note 8, at 555-56.
217. See Roomkin, supra note 8, at 250 (suggesting “a positive relationship between the demand for 
Board intervention and the likelihood of a charging party winning its case”).
218. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 5 (1984). 
219. See Roomkin, supra note 8, at 254. Roomkin, however, found that while unions may be more 
likely to file cases under Democratic administrations, they were no more likely to win them. See id.
220. Id. at 254-56.
221. Id. at 249.
222. Moe, supra note 8, at 1113. The number of cases is also negatively related to unemployment 
and positively related to inflation. Id. at 1109. Union membership also influences constituent behavior 
with it being positively related to the propensity of labor to file cases. Id. at 1113-14. Nonetheless, while 


















   











   
 2692016 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
understand this, it is important to explain how cases are filed at the NLRB, 
as noted in Part II.B.i. and detailed in Figure 1, and how each part of the 
process influences what cases are heard.223 Litigants may alter their behavior
in response to shifting legal rules, which may in turn affect the types of cases
coming before the Board.224 That is, shifting legal circumstance may
transform the behavior of litigants and the types of cases heard by the Board. 
As Moe argues, “[a]n exogenously caused change in any one component 
would reverberate through the whole system, causing a whole series of
adjustments in all three components as they mutually adapt.”225 For instance,
if the Board moves decisions in a pro-labor direction, unions may file more 
cases and the regional board staff may adapt to both constituent filing 
decisions and Board decisions.226 This can lead regional staff to side more
with labor initially; however, if the newly filed cases are less meritorious, 
then this may ultimately bring down the overall rate of pro-labor decisions 
by regional staff.227 If one assessed Board behavior by looking at its 
propensity to favor labor over industry, we would then expect to see the
Board move in a pro-labor direction followed by a set of “moderating 
adjustments” in response to changes in the case mix.228 
To measure case mix, I calculate the rate by which employers file
exceptions to ALJ cases as a percent of all cases. Through the period under
study here, employers filed exceptions in 78% of all cases, and in 84% of all 
CA cases filed against employers. There are some interesting variations to 
this pattern, however. For instance, in 2002 employers filed exceptions in
only 76% in CA cases—a decline of 8% from the average of 84% for the
entire period under study. This decreased number of employer exceptions 
relative to the number of overall cases could be explained by possible 
uncertainty at the time on how the Board under Bush II would rule. There 
might have been more settlements or withdrawals of cases during this period 
as well. Because there is approximately a two-year lag (a median of 559 days
Moe finds economic factors to influence constituent filing behavior, he contends that the probabilities of 
success at both the regional and the Board level motivate propensity to file more so than economic 
conditions. Id. at 1114.
223. See supra Part II.B.i & Figure 1.
224. Moe, supra note 8, at 1098; see also Theodore Eisenberg, Testing the Selection Effect: A New
Theoretical Framework with Empirical Tests, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 337, 337-38 (1990) (discussing selection
effects); George L. Priest, Reexamining the Selection Hypothesis: Learning from Wittman’s Mistakes, 14
J. LEGAL STUD. 215, 243 (1985) (same). 
225. Moe, supra note 8, at 1098. Moe also notes that there could also be a “mutually adaptive 
adjustment” between political actors and the NLRB. Id. at 1100. However, he said it was reasonable to 
assume that the actions of political authorities are exogenous. Id.
226. Indeed, Moe found empirical support for the notion that constituent filing behavior and Board 
decisions explained nearly all the variance in staff filtering decisions. Id. at 1111-12. Moreover,
constituent filing decisions were also strongly related to staff filtering decisions and Board decisions. Id.
at 1112-13.
227. Id. at 1099.
228. Id. at 1099-1100.
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in 2008, for instance) between the ALJ decision and the Board decision, 
much of the time lag occurs between when the ALJ hears the case and when 
the Board issues its decision, with the time lag being a median of 269 days in
2008 and an even longer 420 days in 2003.229 ALJs first heard many of the 
cases decided in 2002 back in 2000 or slightly before. Although there may
be alternative ways to construct this variable, the percentage of total cases in
which employers file exceptions likely serves as a good guide to control for
some of these trends regarding case mix.230 The highest rate of exceptions 
occurred during the latter stages of the Bush presidency, once it was firmly
established that the Board would be Republican-dominated. 
However, it is unlikely that selection effects significantly impact the 
results, contrary to what one may think on first blush. While the Board’s
propensity to decide for or against labor has no doubt fluctuated over time as 
it responds to pressures from labor and the wider political and economic
environments, there is really no long-term trend in either direction in the data 
under analysis in this Article. In his earlier study of the NLRB, Moe similarly
found that the Board’s propensity to decide cases in favor of labor had a
historical mean of .5, meaning that notwithstanding any fluctuations, the 
Board has overall been equally likely to rule for an employer or a union.231 
Moreover, while changes in presidential administration motivate shifts in the 
Board’s propensity to rule in favor of labor, an equilibrating mechanism 
eventually takes hold and cases revert to the mean after an initial shift.232 
Further, as recent research by Daniel Klerman and Alex Lee indicates, the
selection issues may not be as troublesome as earlier scholars predicted.233 
Specifically, they find that while selection effects may mute results with
result to the plaintiff win rate, it does not necessarily mean that the win rate 
is meaningless.234 
Other factors may also reduce the opportunity for a party to behave too
strategically. One could argue that the results could be biased because parties
may choose to settle once they learn of the panel that will hear the case.235 
However, scholars studying this issue in circuit courts of appeals have found
that early announcement of the panel did not appreciably affect settlement 
229. Estreicher, supra note 157, at 372; see also 73 NLRB ANN. REP. 138 (2008); 68 NLRB ANN.
REP. 199 (2003).
230.  In addition, in other iterations of the model not reported here, I lag this variable by two years. 
231. Moe, supra note 8, at 1106.
232. Id. at 1106-07.
233. Klerman & Lee, supra note 146, at 209 (observing that “even taking selection effects into
account, one may be able to make valid inferences from the percentage of plaintiff trial victories, because
selection effects are partial”).
234. Id.
235. R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding?: An Empirical 
Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1175 (2004).
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behavior.236 Moreover, as noted above, the time lag between the ALJ decision
and the NLRB decision can be many years.237 The party filing an unfair labor 
practice dispute has no way of anticipating the composition of the Board
years down the road when the Board will hear the case, especially if there is
an intervening presidential election. Parties will only learn the actual panel
composition shortly before the hearing.238 At that point, the marginal cost of
an appeal is relatively low.239 Furthermore, at many points in the process, the
general ideological tendency of the Board is no secret; during a Democratic
administration, there is a greater chance you will get a majority-Democratic 
Board, while during a Republican administration, the odds change. 
Consequently, the panel announcement may not offer any additional useful 
information because the general ideological tendency of the Board may be
known even at the time of the ALJ decision. The information is also available 
to both sides, so while disclosure may prompt one party to want to settle, it
can equally compel the other party to harden its stance to have the case heard
by a friendly Board.240 Moreover, many of the parties in NLRB proceedings
are repeat litigants, and thus may have less incentive to settle because they 
may want the Board to issue a favorable legal ruling applicable to future
cases.241 Taken together, the foregoing factors underscore the impracticality
of strategically bringing or withholding charges before the Board based on 
prospective assumptions of panel composition. Such strategic behavior by 
litigants is therefore unlikely to be a factor in panel outcomes.
To ensure that the mix of cases is fairly consistent across panels and 
years, I regressed case characteristics—such as statutory section, number of
charges, region of the country, tone of ALJ decision, and tone of Board 
decision—on panel type and found no statistically significant differences
among panels. I did a similar analysis with respect to years and found no
discernible differences to indicate that case composition differs measurably 
from year to year. All told, the types of cases that the Board hears are fairly
consistent from year to year. 
Number of Charges. I coded each case to reflect the number of charges
against the charged party. The number of charges could influence Board
236. See Samuel P. Jordan, Early Panel Announcement, Settlement, and Adjudication, 2007 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 55, 60-61 (2007).
237. See supra sources cited in and text accompanying note 229.
238. Richard L. Revesz, Litigation and Settlement in the Federal Appellate Courts: Impact of Panel
Selection Procedures on Ideologically Divided Courts, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 685, 688-89 (2000). 
239. See Meehan Rasch, Not Taking Frivolity Lightly: Circuit Variance in Determining Frivolous 
Appeals Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38, 62 ARK. L. REV. 249, 264 (2009) (“[E]motion-
laden, nonprevailing parties have little to lose by appealing, especially given the minimal court costs 
associated with taking an appeal.”); Yung, supra note 10, Judged by the Company You Keep, at 1198.
240. For other reasons why early disclosure may not prompt settlement, see Jordan, supra note 236,
at 78-91.
241. See Revesz, supra note 238, at 700-01.
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decisions in one of two ways. First, the number of charges could be positively
related to liberal Board outcomes, because the probability of a decision
against the respondent may increase when the number of charges increases.242 
Second, there might also be diminishing returns with increased charges, 
making more charges redundant to the results.243 The number of charges also
would likely contribute to an increased probability that the Board will split 
the decision (rule in favor of labor on some charges and against labor on 
others).244 
Type of Case. I separately analyzed CA (against employer) and 
CB/CC/CD cases (against unions), and I separated out the analysis for CA 
cases based on the portion of the statute the employer is accused of violating 
section 8(a)(1), 8(a)(2), 8(a)(3), 8(a)(4) or 8(a)(5).245 Hypothetically, as 
discussed in Part I.C, it could be easier for the Board to inject partisanship 
into the decision-making process in cases where the legal standard is more
nebulous. Even if the Board wanted to find for a particular party in these 
cases, as a legal matter, it would be difficult to do anything other than affirm 
the ALJ decision. By contrast, section 8(a)(5) cases involve the looser 
standard of deciding whether or not the employer (or union in CB et al. cases)
acted in “good faith.”246 While the underlying factual issues of such a “good 
faith” determination rests on credibility grounds, the ultimate weighing of 
those facts and the assessment of whether the totality of those facts constitute
“good faith” offers the opportunity for ideological attitudes or partisan
decision-making to influence the process to a greater degree. Thus, taking
into account the specific statutory sections challenged lends greater credence 
to the robustness of the results. 
Region. The region where the case arises could also impact the results, 
with the Board perhaps deciding cases differently across regions. Cases
hailing from the South, for instance, may be less pro-labor because the South, 
as a whole, is more conservative.247 Moreover, the Board may think more 
highly of the work from one region and thus may be more likely to affirm 
decisions of ALJs from that region.248 I coded this as a dummy variable, with 
“1” indicating that a case arose from the South.249 
242. See Taratoot, Review of Administrative Law Judge Decisions, supra note 8, at 563.
243. See id.
244. See id. at 564.
245.  There were only a few cases with challenges under section 8(a)(2) or 8(a)(4).
246. See Brudney et al., supra note 83, at 1707.
247. See, e.g., Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 11, at 363 (finding that the South is more 
conservative than other regions in adjudicating asylum cases).
248. For more discussion of how NLRB cases are analyzed at the regional level, see, for example,
Diane E. Schmidt, The Presidential Appointment Process, Task Environment Pressures, and Regional 
Office Case Processing, 48 POL. RES. Q. 381 (1995).
249. The ALJs hear cases out of four regions: Atlanta, Washington D.C., San Francisco and New 
York. See  NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, REGIONAL OFFICES, www.nlrb.gov/who-we-
are/regional-offices (last visited Aug. 15, 2016). In alternative specifications, I included dummy variables 
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Year Fixed Effects. The status of labor in American society remained 
relatively stable throughout the sixteen-year period under study. Congress 
passed no major laws, and there were no significant changes in the public’s
attitude toward labor or labor unions. There could, however, be some
uncaptured time trend not picked up by the other variables that might explain 
the Board’s voting behavior. I included year dummy variables for each year;
in another specification, I included a time trend variable. I also separately
analyzed pre- and post-2002 cases in another specification as I detail later. 
E. Statistical Results 
The results of the statistical analysis are presented in Tables 1 and 2 
using Coding Styles 1 and 2 respectively. In Table 1, in the models containing
CA cases, the coefficients on RRD and RRR are negative and statistically 
significant at the 99% confidence level, indicating that the indicated panels
are all less likely to grant relief than all-Democratic and mixed-Democratic
panels. The coefficient for the DDR variable is also statistically significant at 
the 95% confidence level. For the CB case model, only the RRD variable is 
statistically significant. Most striking is the difference between panel types 
when looking at CA cases. Figure 12 shows the predicted probabilities for 
CA cases. Holding all other variables at their mean, an all-Democratic panel
will grant relief to the pro-labor litigant 90% of the time. Substituting a 
Republican in for one Democrat changes this figure to 84%. The figures 
decrease for each additional Republican added to the panel: when the panel 
has only one Democrat instead of two, the predicted probability of a pro-
labor decision is 75%; this number declines to 60% when the panel is all-
Republican. Panel effects are even more stark using Coding Style 2, where 
there is nearly a 50% difference between all-Democratic and all-Republican 
panels. Moreover, there is a large difference between RRD and RRR panels,
with RRD panels having a 69% probability of voting in favor of labor, while 
RRR panels vote in favor of labor just 31% of the time. Furthermore, DDR
panels are not different statistically from DDD panels using the more 
legalistic Coding Style 2. In addition, while the tone of the ALJ decision is 
the most substantively important variable predicting labor outcomes at the 
Board, the panel configuration still persists as a statistically significant
variable in regression models irrespective of the coding style. In all, 
irrespective of legal considerations, panel type matters. These results are the 
same even if one restricts the analysis to just CA or CB cases, or to cases
involving only certain statutory violations.250 
for each of the aforementioned areas, using Washington D.C. as the reference category. The results did 
not differ.
250.  The results are also robust to different configurations of the standard errors.
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N 2675 2461 214 
Pseduo R2 0.5034 0.4625 0.3928 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Time fixed effects not shown for brevity.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
251. DDD panels served as the reference category.
252. In other specifications, I alternatively substituted in unemployment rate. Due to 
multicollinearity between the variables, I rejected using both variables in the same analysis, though when
I included both variables, neither were significant.
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Robust standard errors in parentheses. Time fixed effects not shown for brevity.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
253 DDD panels served as the reference category.  
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Figure 12
Predictive Margins with 95% Confidence Intervals 














































Coding Style 2 
DDD DDR RRD RRR DDD DDR RRD RRR 
Panel Type Panel Type 
The results also persist looking at the data broke down by the ALJ 
decision. As shown in Figure 13 and looking at CA cases, holding all
variables at the mean and assuming that the ALJ ruled in favor of labor, all-
Democratic panels vote in favor of labor 96% of the time whereas all-
Republican panels vote in labor’s favor only 40% of the time. If the ALJ
decision is conservative, panel effects are clear between Democratic-majority
and Republican-majority panels. Republican-majority panels have almost a 
0% probability of voting in labor’s favor in these circumstances, whereas an
all-Democratic panel will vote opposite to the ALJ in a liberal direction 40%
of the time. Likewise, there are noticeable differences with mixed panels, 
with DDR panels having a predicted probability of 26% and RRD panels 
having a figure 13% voting in favor of labor when the ALJ rules in a pro-
industry direction.
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Figure 13
Predictive Margins with 95% Confidence Intervals 
by ALJ Decision and Panel Type 













































DDD DDR RRD RRR DDD DDR RRD RRR 
Panel Type Panel Type 
To confirm my results, I also exploited the fact that cases are supposed 
to be randomly assigned in order to do a simple test using Board composition
fixed effects. During the study period, the Board’s composition usually 
changed every few months as new members were added to the Board or as
appointees waited to be confirmed, sitting as recess appointments in the 
interim. Because cases at the Board are generally randomly assigned, one can 
thus do a simple test, similar to a difference-in-differences test, to analyze the
difference between a treatment (which in this case is whether or not the Board 
had additional Republican members) and a control (the absence of
Republican members).254 Due to the dichotomous nature of the problem, I did 
simple logit regressions using Board composition fixed effects as an
additional covariate to account for the period in time in which the Board
heard each case. There were twenty-nine different combinations of the Board
during this time frame. I compared all of the different iterations of the Board 
(DDD v. DDR, DDD v. RRD, DDD v. RRR, DDR v. RRD, RRD v. RRR) to
see if the results would differ. In this way, the data is almost like a natural 
254. The analyses were conducted using a technique similar to that used by Matthew Hall. See
Matthew Hall, Randomness Reconsidered: Modeling Random Judicial Assignment in the U.S. Courts of
Appeals, 7 J. EMP. LEGAL STUD. 574, 581 (2010) (using natural experiment of random assignment to study
decision-making in the courts of appeals); Matthew Hall, Experimental Justice: Random Judicial 
Assignment and the Partisan Process of Supreme Court Review, 37 AM. POL. RES. 195, 206 (2009)
(exploiting random assignment to assess how partisanship of judges impacts whether the Supreme Court 
will hear a case and overturn the lower court decision).
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experiment, with the only difference between the cases being the partisan
composition of the panel hearing the case. This approach has the benefit of 
being able to account for endogenity in the data (to the extent any exists) 
because under an assumption of random assignments, we can assume that
case characteristics among the panels would be similar across panel type, 
with the only difference between panels being the “treatment” of panel type.
Table 3 and Figure 14 displays the results for CA cases. The results using this 
alternative system comported with the earlier analysis. 



























t statistics in parentheses; fixed effects for Board composition eliminated for brevity. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
255. I also did this analysis using other covariates (the other independent variables used in the 
analysis for Tables 1 and 2), and came to the same results.
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Figure 14
Predictive Margins with 95% Confidence Intervals 











































Coding Style 2 
DDD DDR RRD RRR DDD DDR RRD RRR 
Panel Types Panel Types 
As noted in Part II.D.iv, the analysis above may be tainted by the fact 
that the propensity to get a certain panel depends on the specific time frame. 
Consequently, the analysis may overestimate the effect of panel composition, 
even though case mix and year fixed effects/time trend are included in the 
model. To address this potential concern, I redid the analysis separating the
Clinton (1993-2001) and Bush II (2002-2007) Boards, for CA cases only.256 
The results were the same. In the pre-2002 period dominated by a Democratic
Board, panels with at least two Democrats (DDR or DDD panels) ruled for 
labor about 89% of the time, holding all variables at their means. However, 
panels with two Republicans (RRD panels) ruled for labor only 79% of the 
time. As before, the coefficient on the RRD panels is statistically significant, 
while there is little to no difference between DDD and DDR panels 
statistically. In the post-2002 period, DDR panels ruled in favor of labor 85%
of the time while RRD panels ruled in labor’s favor 68%, holding all other 
variables at their means. The number declines to 31% for all-Republican 
panels. Adding more Republicans to the panel decreases the propensity to 
rule in favor of labor irrespective of the time period. 
In other specifications not reported here for brevity, I explored 
distributed lags on some of the right-hand side variables. For some of the 
data, particularly the economic data, it would be proper to impose a lag of
256.  The analysis for all cases and CB-only cases is similar.
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one period of time in order to give the Board time to react to changes in 
economic conditions.257 I also explored interactions between economic 
conditions, presidents, and Congress, as the impact of economic conditions 
may vary depending on relevant political actors and their own responses to 
economic conditions.258 As a final additional robustness measure, I also 
looked at the data with an alternative dependent variable, breaking the 
analysis down by Board member vote as opposed to looking at case outcomes 
as a whole. This alternative specification produces similar results, with a 
large discrepancy remaining between all-Democratic and all-Republican 
panels. 
The model presented in the prior tables used as its dependent variable a 
simple dichotomous measure of whether the case favored labor in whole or 
in part. Such a measure is quite crude, and it could mask significant variation
underneath the surface. As noted previously, the NLRB renders a significant
number of split decisions, and as such it may be unfair to ascribe partial 
decisions to always be in favor of labor. To address this effect, I present an
alternative model that estimates via ordered logit analysis the NLRB’s
propensity to vote for or against labor. Given the greater information 
available from a more fine-tuned selection of data, I wanted to explore 
whether panel effects persist once the data is looked at in this alternative 
specification. 
In this next iteration of the model, the dependent variable has four levels: 
(1) pro-labor, (2) leaning labor, (3) leaning industry, and (4) pro-industry.
Table 4 above displays the results using an ordered logit regression. I 
conducted this analysis by both ordinary least squares (“OLS”) multinomial
logit and found the same results. I did the graphs using only CA cases coded 
in Coding Style 2. As before, variables such as the ALJ decision influence 
decision-making. Panel variables are also significant. For instance, looking
only at the case outcome decided fully in favor of industry reveals that all-
Republican panels have a predicted probability of 36% to vote fully in favor 
of industry, whereas all-Democratic panels vote this way only 8% of the time.
Likewise, all-Democratic panels are more likely to vote entirely in favor of
labor, with DDD panels having a predicted probability of 47% of voting 
entirely in favor of labor with RRR panels voting entirely in favor of labor 
just 12% of the time. If one looks only at the cases decided partly in favor of
labor or industry, panel effects are much less evident; rather, the predicted 
probabilities for DDR and RRD panel types are virtually indistinguishable. 
257. See Moe, supra note 8, at 1108.
258. See id. at 1111.
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Robust standard errors in parentheses; year fixed effects omitted for brevity.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Figure 15
Predictive Margins with 95% Confidence Intervals 
4-Prong Board Variable by Panel Type 
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The study, of course, has several limitations. First, concentrating merely
on votes is overly simplistic. This is particularly true here because so many
of the cases under review concerned split decisions. For instance, a Board
member may have determined that finding additional violations was 
unnecessary because such violations would not have affected the remedy. 
Second, focusing purely on votes risks missing a great deal of information 
that may be equally important in explaining vote choice. For example, Board
members may bargain with each other over how broadly or narrowly to 
decide cases, or over whether to write a formal opinion at all. In two cases
with nearly identical facts, the Board may simply affirm the ALJ decision 
without writing a formal opinion in one case, but write a detailed precedential
opinion in other case. Finally, there may also be more subtle forms of
influence.259 Board members sitting on multiple panels that meet the same 
day may be more or less concerned with some cases than others. It is
impossible to speculate the extent to which vote trading could occur. Indeed,
how to incorporate “legal” reasoning in a quantitative analysis is something 
difficult to do in practice, given the realities of how judges make decisions. 
More work could be done to better “control” for legal doctrine by, for 
259. See Pauline T. Kim, Deliberation and Strategy on the United States Courts of Appeals: An
Empirical Exploration of Panel Effects, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 1319, 1345 (noting how judges
may vote strategically). 
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instance, coding decisions with respect to the specific legal issues involved
in the case or the standard of review used. 
Although I tried alternative specifications to deal with the issue, 
potential endogenity is also of concern. As detailed in Part II.D.iv, the NLRB 
is a part of a moving and mutually adaptive chain of lower and upper level 
legal actors, each of whom has their own political preferences on how they 
would like labor policy to lean. How to properly incorporate the 
interconnecting actors into any statistical model is fraught with difficulty. In
nearly all of the regressions, the “tone” of the ALJ decision—whether the 
ALJ ruled for or against labor—had the most substantively important impact 
in influencing the Board’s vote. It may be the case, however, that some of 
the political, economic and case-specific variables in the model in turn 
predict the ALJ’s propensity to vote in a certain way. As such, the model may 
underestimate the impact that some of the variables have on Board voting.
However, the substantive impact of the findings with respect to partisanship
are so strong here that even accounting for these issues would not distract 
from the general finding that partisanship appears to be motivating Board 
votes. Disentangling the web of causation is a difficult task. Moreover, 
potential multicollinearity between the various independent variables could
cloud any assessment of the result. 
III. 
CONCLUSIONS, POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
In this last Part, I offer conclusions, propose reforms, and suggest areas
of future research. In Part III.A, I first offer some thoughts on the study itself 
and what conclusions we can draw from it. In Part III.B, I make a normative 
argument suggesting possible reforms that might mitigate partisanship at the 
Board. Finally, in Part III.C, I offer some suggestions for future research. 
A. Conclusions 
In all, the results of my study suggest that Democrats on panels at the 
NLRB behave differently than Republicans, and that members’ voting
proclivity may very well depend on the party of their co-panelists. 
Nonetheless, one should be cautious in making too much of these findings.
As shown, the effect of partisanship may very well depend on the timeframe 
under study as well as factors impacting the pool of cases before the Board. 
While I sought to control those effects,260 making a direct comparison is still
difficult because strategic factors could influence what kind of cases the
260. In other specifications, I tried alternative ways of measuring case mix. The results did not 
change. 
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Board hears.261 Of course, the estimates of partisan ideology could be biased
by the omission of variables that perhaps correlate with ideology. However,
that risk is relatively low because Board cases are supposed to be randomly 
assigned, and because I use regression analysis to control for differences in
voting rates across time and place. Further, the regressions include controls 
for various case characteristics to further reduce the risk of omitted variable 
bias. 
Notably, political variables—regarding Congress, the President, and the 
Court—are insignificant. Time and time again, the most important predictors 
of how the NLRB will rule is the panel type and ALJ decision. The absence 
of significance for political variables suggests that politicians do not directly 
control the actions of the NLRB outside the appointment process. For 
instance, the NLRB does not appear to become more liberal if the House
changes hands from Republican to Democrat, nor does the NLRB appear to 
be bound by the ideology of the reviewing appellate court. Rather, the impact 
of partisanship must be seen through the lens of the appointment process. The 
results in this study show why debates about NLRB appointments are so
contentious: we can expect NLRB appointees to act as partisans once on the
Board, and this partisanship appears to be magnified if they by chance sit on 
a panel with other co-partisans. The results concerning political variables 
were robust to different specifications of the variables. 
Importantly, these results differ somewhat from the findings of Barry
Weingast and Mark Moran and from others who provided evidence that 
changes in congressional oversight influence agency action.262 In their 
seminal article, Weingast and Moran examine the behavior of the Federal 
Trade Commission (“FTC”) to assess the extent to which Congress 
dominates the Agency’s decision-making.263 Building on a model of 
legislative choice, the authors show how the FTC initiated controversial
policies in line with signals received from congressional oversight.264 They
conclude that the FTC’s activity—or lack of activity—is “remarkably
sensitive” to changes in the composition of congressional oversight 
committees,265 underscoring the importance of so-called political principals 
in motivating agency outcomes and aligning agency discretion with political 
principals in the other branches of government. Others building on Weingast 
and Moran’s work explain more about the mechanics of political control,
261. Although my findings have been robust with respect to different types of cases (just section
8(a)(1) cases, etc.), I hope to do more fine-grained analysis of case content using a textual analysis program
to confirm these results. 
262. See Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control?
Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765 (1983).
263. See id. at 766.
264. Id. at 777-79.
265. Id. at 793.
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emphasizing the role that different controls by Congress can have on agency
outcomes.266 
Nonetheless, there are several explanations for why this study finds null 
results concerning the impact of political principals. First, Weingast and
Moran studied the FTC’s choice of cases, assuming that the Agency avoids
controversy by pursuing trivial cases or promotes consumerism by selecting
cases aligned with that goal.267 Here, the dependent variable is different; we 
are actually looking at the content of the decisions, as the NLRB itself has no
discretion over whether or not to hear a case once the General Counsel 
decides to pursue charges.268 The choice of whether to pursue charges and the 
actual outcome of a case are very different procedural postures laden with
different assumptions about congressional control. In particular, as noted 
previously, the Board has very little choice as a legal matter in many cases.269 
For instance, if the case concerns credibility determinations, there is little the 
Board can do to overturn the ALJ decision.270 Moreover, Weingast and 
Moran (and other scholars) do not consider how lower-level agency decision 
makers (such as the ALJ) and subsequent decision-makers (such as the 
courts) impact cases.271 They also do not consider how legalistic factors, such 
as the procedural posture or the actual statute relied upon, can mediate the 
extent to which politics dominates decision-making.272 Furthermore, much of 
the research stemming from the congressional dominance school was 
conducted in the early 1980s studying data from earlier periods prior to the 
ideological turn of the Reagan years.273 
What do this study’s results say about the way an independent agency 
should act? The fact that we see Board members behaving differently 
depending on who is on the panel may very well be how we envisioned the 
NLRB to operate. The Agency’s critics lambast it for its supposed constant 
switch in doctrine upon the advent of a new presidential administration.274 
However, while this may occur to some extent on high-profile cases, for the
most part, what is readily apparent from reading almost 3,000 cases is that
the vast majority of NLRB cases deal with routine subject matters, such as
266. See, e.g., Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked:
Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166 (1984) (identifying two oversight 
techniques used by Congress: police patrol and fire alarm oversight).
267. Weingast & Moran, supra note 262, at 777-79.
268. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2012) (setting forth powers of the Board). 
269. See supra Part II.B. 
270. See supra Part II.B and note 91.
271. See Weingast & Moran, supra note 262, at 789; Cooke et al., supra note 8 (not including ALJ
in the regression analysis); Delorme et al., supra note 8 (same).
272. See Weingast & Moran, supra note 262, at 789.
273. For instance, Weingast and Moran look at the relationship between Congress and the FTC
between 1964-1976. Id. at 784-88.
274. See supra Part I.A.
Semet Formatted 9 12-1.docx (Do Not Delete) 9/13/2016 12:07 PM     






















    
    
    
286 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW Vol. 37:2
whether a given set of employees’ rights were violated by an employer. Many
litigants before the NLRB are individuals protesting allegedly illegal actions 
of their employers, and the court decisions arising from the NLRB reflect this
case pattern. Thus, while there may be some shifts in doctrine on certain high-
profile issues, the majority of ordinary employee-employer disputes are 
handled fairly consistently from year to year. After all, partisanship can only 
rear its head for certain types of cases; for instance, if the employer appeals
the lower court case based wholly on credibility findings, there is little a 
partisan Board member can do about it.275 Since findings of fact are entitled
to deference by the Board, the holding of the ALJ will stand no matter the 
proclivities of individual Board members.276 
Perhaps this is how the Board should work: on the majority of routine 
cases, legal issues should predominate, but on high-profile policy issues, 
there should be room for individual Board members to inject their personal 
opinion into decisions. As presidential appointees, Board members properly
reflect the President’s agenda. In this way, panel effects may reflect that the
system is working as intended. 
Although we should expect Board members to reflect the ideology of
presidents who appointed them, we should also primarily view the Board as 
an expert policymaking body. Indeed, there is a constant tension between 
expertness and democratic accountability in agency design.277 Having the 
Board members appointed by the President fulfills the aim of holding the 
Board democratically accountable to the people. However, while democratic 
accountability is important, so too is ensuring that the Board does not stray 
too far from of its role as an expert policymaking body.
B. Policy Prescriptions 
As I discuss in more detail below, three changes could bring the Board 
closer to its primary role as an expert policymaking body. First, the Board’s
rules should be reformed to mandate panel diversity or to at least foreclose 
DDD or RRR panels from hearing cases. Second, the Board should use more
rulemaking to set forth standards that could guide case outcomes. Finally, the 
agency appointment process should be changed to ensure that fewer partisan
members are appointed to the Board. These three changes would do much to 
ensure that the Board does not swing too far in the direction of 
politicization.278 
275. See supra Part II.B. 
276. See supra Part II.B. 
277.  For discussion, see, for example, Barkow, supra note 103, at 19-26.
278. Some scholars even advance removing the NLRB from being an adjudicator. For example, Zev 
Eigen and Sandro Garofalo argue that the Board’s adjudicatory power should be stripped and transferred 
to the federal district courts. See Eigen & Garofalo, supra note 25, at 1893-98.
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The Board would be a less political body—or at least be perceived as 
being less political—if it mandated politically diverse panels. Scholars argue 
that diverse bodies simply make better decisions.279 Judge Harry Edwards of 
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia and Michael
A. Livermore contend that diversity fosters collegiality, which in turn leads 
to the exchange of more correct information.280 Here, the panel effects are
likely not caused by whistleblowing. The NLRB largely ignores appellate 
court decisions and the Supreme Court rarely hears cases, so there is really 
no one to hear a blown whistle. The panel effects here are likely caused by 
ideologues voting at the extremes with collegiality tempering opinions. 
Mandating mixed panels could reduce the ability of ideologues to vote in an 
extreme fashion. The NLRB does not have explicit partisan balancing 
requirements, and the results here indicate that perhaps justice is not best 
served by this arrangement. At least in part, the random partisan composition 
of the panel appears to determine the case’s outcome, at least in part. 
Mandating panel diversity might surface a tension between collegiality
and dissent. On the one hand, the number of dissents might rise if the
background of judges were varied enough to threaten norms of collegiality. 
On the other hand, the Board’s decision “is more likely to be right . . . if it is
supported by panelists of different predilections.”281 Moreover, if only mixed
panels made decisions, the five-member Board might be less likely to 
subsequently overrule these decisions and flip-flop the Board’s policy.
Another solution may be to simply increase the size of the Board to seven 
members, with the Board sitting in panels of five. Such a change would in
essence mandate panel diversity and would be “less antagonistic” to judicial
tradition than a statutory requirement of mixed panels.282 
The NLRB could also engage in more rulemaking to make decisions less 
ad hoc. Unlike many other administrative agencies, the NLRB rarely engages
in rulemaking.283 Indeed, over the Agency’s history, the NLRB has only 
279. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard Murphy, Politicized Judicial Review in Administrative Law: 
Three Improbable Responses, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 319, 356-57 (2012); Edwards, The Effects of
Collegiality, supra note 107, at 1650-51.
280. See Edwards & Livermore, supra note 107, at 1951-52. For more on the literature on
collegiality, see Frank B. Cross, Review Essay, Collegial Ideology in the Courts, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 
1399 (2009).
281. SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 109, at 136; see also Edwards & Livermore, supra note 107, at 
1952 (noting that dissents on collegial courts occur because of “honest disagreement” over the law). 
282. Shapiro & Murphy, supra note 279, at 361. Shapiro and Murphy, for instance, advocate 
increasing panel sizes to five members instead of three so as to increase the likelihood of getting more
balanced panels. Id. at 356-61.
283. Brudney, supra note 36, at 234.
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promulgated one rule, instead preferring to do its work through individual
adjudications.284 The time is ripe for the NLRB to at least consider codifying 
certain rules to guide decision-making in cases.285 For instance, instead of
relying on Board adjudications to define the term “employee,” the Board
instead could engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking or issue policy 
statements to set forth clear standards on who is entitled to protection under
the Act.286 One of the NLRB’s greatest challenges as a policymaking body is
that adjudications come too fast, at too great a volume, and are decided by 
too many different decision makers for the Agency to foster consistent policy.
Using rulemaking to impose clearer standards would do much to make the 
Board a more expert policymaking body. Board member Alexander Acosta 
has advanced rulemaking as a solution to make the Board more efficient and
consistent.287 
Rules would also give greater guidance to the General Counsel on 
whether or not to issue complaints, perhaps leading to more settlements 
because Board decisions would appear more predictable.288 It would bring the
Agency more in line with how most other administrative agencies conduct
their business.289 Rulemaking would also offer the chance for the agencies 
and parties to collect and analyze information so as to foster best practices.290 
In these ways, a system of limited rulemaking to guide adjudicatory decisions
would do much to impose greater fairness and consistency in the system by
mediating panel effects on case outcomes. Under this system, Board
members would have to affirmatively consider the rule when making
decisions, thereby leading to fewer ad hoc decisions.291 Further, appellate 
courts may be more likely to defer to an agency rule as opposed to an 
adjudication since the rulemaking process by necessity is a more inclusive 
284. The NLRB to date has only participated in one rulemaking. See Appropriate Bargaining Units 
in the Health Care Industry, 29 C.F.R. § 103.30 (1991); see also Am. Hosp. Assoc. v. N.L.R.B., 499 U.S.
606, 620 (1991) (approving the NLRB’s health-care bargaining unit). For a discussion of the NLRB’s first 
foray into rulemaking, see Mark H. Grunewald, The NLRB’s First Rulemaking: An Exercise in
Pragmatism, 41 DUKE L.J. 274 (1991).
285. See Charlotte Garden, Toward Politically Stable NLRB Lawmaking: Rulemaking vs.
Adjudication, 64 EMORY L.J. 1469, 1473-77 (2015); Alexander Acosta, Rebuilding the Board: An
Argument for Structural Change, Over Policy Prescription, at the NLRB, 5 FLA. INT’L L. REV. 347, 359 
(2010).
286. See, e.g., Acosta, supra note 285, at 359 (proposing that the Board engage in rulemaking); 
Claire Tuck, Note, Policy Formulation at the NLRB: A Viable Alternative to Notice and Comment 
Rulemaking, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1117, 1117 (2005) (proposing policy statements as an alternative to
rulemaking). 
287. Acosta, supra note 285, at 359 (arguing that rulemaking “will help stabilize Board law and 
restore public and judicial confidence in the agency”).
288. Id. at 352.
289. See id.
290. Garden, supra note 285, at 1475; Brudney, supra note 36, at 235-36.
291. Brudney, supra note 36, at 234-36.
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process.292 This change need not be limited to notice-and-comment 
rulemaking; the Board could also offer insight to litigating parties through 
the issuance of guidance documents from the General Counsel Office or non-
binding statements of policy, which do not have to undergo the procedural 
hurdles of notice and comment rulemaking under the Administrative 
Procedures Act.293 Indeed, even if the NLRB wanted to continue to engage 
exclusively in adjudications, it could do more to make its legal precedent 
more consistent. For instance, it could adopt a so-called “rule of four” such 
that all cases necessitating a policy reversal be heard by all five NLRB 
members and that at least four members vote for the proposed change.294 
Alternatively, the Agency could require that the Board issue a special
justification if it reverses established Board policy.295 
The political nature of NLRB decision-making also raises the question 
of whether changes in the appointment process are warranted. Prior to the 
1980s, Board appointees were generally moderate in their decision-
making.296 Indeed, nominations to early Boards hailed mostly from 
government service or academia.297 The appointment process, however,
became much more ideological in the Reagan years, with the Senate asserting 
a more direct role by exercising less deference to presidential picks.298 
Changes in the appointment process over the last decade—including the rise 
of so-called “package nominations” where groups of nominees for different 
governmental posts are “packaged” together for a Senate vote—exacerbated
the trend of a more partisan nomination process.299 More extreme 
nominees—on both sides of the political spectrum—were placed on the 
Board, resulting in a sea change in the ideological nature of Board decision-
making. In bemoaning the rampant rise of “packaged” nominations since
1994, former Board member William Gould argues that the “batching” of 
nominees “frequently means the lowest common denominator,” with
292. See Garden, supra note 285, at 1475; Hirsch, supra note 214, at 457-58.
293. Acosta, supra note 285, at 352. There are, of course, disadvantages to rulemaking as well, as it 
involves more time and costs and offers less flexibility to adopt to new and changing circumstances. See
Hirsch, supra note 214, at 458; Acosta, supra note 285, at 357-58 (noting disadvantages to rulemaking). 
294. Samuel Estreicher, Depoliticizing the National Labor Relations Board: Administrative Steps, 
64 EMORY L.J. 1611, 1616 (2015).
295. Id. at 1617. Samuel Estreicher also argues that the NLRB could improve decision-making by
improving access to better information. Id. at 1617-18.
296. See supra Part I.A; Flynn, supra note 14, at 1366.
297. See supra Part I.A.
298. See supra Part I.A.
299. See Flynn, supra note 14, at 1366. Indeed, with one exception, excluding recess appointments, 
all of President Clinton’s nominees to the NLRB were package appointments. Administration Faces 
Possibility of Four Vacancies, No Quorum, at NLRB, 1997 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) NO. 202, at A-8 (Oct. 
20, 1997) (noting that Clinton had to make recess appointments to keep the Agency up and running).  
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appointments being composed mostly of Washington insiders.300 This 
change, of course, was not limited to the NLRB; appointments to other
agencies followed a similar pattern.301 At the turn of the twenty-first century, 
the NLRB consisted of two ex-management lawyers, two former union
lawyers, a former law professor, and a career Board employee—exactly the
type of Board that Congress expressly rejected when designing the NLRB.302 
The appointment process should be altered to put the President back in 
the driver’s seat. Presidents generally have a greater incentive to choose more
moderate nominees, whereas senators—particularly Republican senators 
with ties to industry—may need to curry favor with supporters intent on
diminishing the role of organized labor. The Senate’s internal rules (such as
the increasing practice of allowing individual senators to issue “holds” on 
nominations to delay consideration of a particular matter) and the Senate 
committee system (which ensures that few senators actually have a stake in
the outcome of NLRB decisions) give even more power to the Senate as an 
institution—and to individual senators on appointment committees—to
control the appointments process and in turn to control who gets appointed 
to the NLRB.303 This is not really how a so-called “independent” agency is
meant to function, with the “control” of the appointment process shifted from 
the President to a single group of senators on the appointments committee. 
Indeed, an adjudicative body handpicked by a select group of senators could
hardly be the type of Board that was envisioned during the New Deal. This 
issue, of course, is not unique to the NLRB. The increased polarization of the 
appointment process characterizes many administrative agencies.304 But the 
process can be changed to ensure that the President has more say. For 
instance, the NLRA could be amended to expressly require a certain type of 
person be appointed to the Board; that is, perhaps the NLRB should return to
its mid-twentieth century form when most of its members were appointed
300. William B. Gould, IV, Politics and the Effects of the National Labor Relations Board’s
Adjudicative and Rulemaking Processes, 64 EMORY L.J. 1501, 1526 (2015).
301. See Gillian E. Metzger, Agencies, Polarization, and the States, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1739, 1762
& n.112 (2015) (noting how insiders composed many of the appointments); Norris, supra note 5
(describing increasing influence of partisanship in selecting SEC commissioners).
302. Turner, supra note 8, at 74 (listing experience of Board members in the Appendix). When
designing the NLRB, Congress expressly declined to adopt Senator Wagner’s original bill that would have
set up the Board members as having two members “designated as representatives of employers, two as
representatives of employees, and three as representatives of the general public.” Flynn, supra note 14, at 
1363-64.
303. As one scholar notes, the administrative process is “little more than the sum of a disjointed set 
of political calculations,” as the Senate “often delays confirmation until several nominations to the same
agency accumulate, thus allowing it to require that the president include some nominees who are
effectively designated by powerful senators.” G. CALVIN MACKENZIE, STARTING OVER: THE 
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENT PROCESS IN 1997, at 31 (1998).
304. See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 301, at 1762.
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from public service or academia rather than management or labor.305 At the
very least, the Board (and Congress and the President) should do more to 
heed the advice of former chairman Gould, who argues that the “very best 
people” reflecting diverse background should be appointed to the Board, as 
opposed to Washington insiders or candidates who are able to curry favor
with Senators.306 
C. Future Research and Conclusions 
Ultimately, the debate continues about the meaning of “independent” 
agency. As many scholars have noted, there is a call for change at the Board 
to adjust the agency for the twenty-first century.307 We need more empirical
analysis of administrative agencies to assess whether they operate 
consistently with our vision of agency independence. Do we want ideological 
appointments on independent boards to vote in line with their partisan
preferences? After all, maybe an adjudicatory body can be both independent
and partisan. Or do we want independent agencies to decide cases free from
the reins of partisanship? Are we troubled by the random chance of a 
Democrat or a Republican on a panel influencing how the panel will rule? In 
light of the ideological nature of the appointment process, it is unlikely that 
the Board will return to its original mission of serving as an unbiased expert. 
But maybe that is good enough. Maybe the presidential appointment process 
provides the sufficient measure of checks and balances to protect against 
excesses by any one branch of government. 
In all, almost 80 years since its founding, the NLRB is in some ways a 
very different agency that the one created during the New Deal. As Board 
member Acosta argued, the Board today is operating with institutions formed 
before World War II.308 All too frequently the Board is seen as a political 
vehicle for party in power to use to force a certain agenda for or against 
labor.309 The Board today functions very much like a court, which is all the 
more ironic given the fact that the Board was formed specifically to ensure 
that labor disputes not be routinely handled exclusively in the courts.310 The 
NLRB should return to its roots and be respected for the expertise—both 
labor and legal-based—that it has. 
305. See supra Part I.A. The NLRA, however, never expressly set forth specific requirements 
(partisan or otherwise) to be a member of the Board. See Gould, supra note 300, at 1507.
306. See id. at 1526.
307. See, e.g., Julius G. Getman, The NLRB: What Went Wrong and Should We Try to Fix It? 64
EMORY L.J. 1495, 1499 (2015) (noting that the Board is partly to blame for its diminished role in labor 
policy).
308. See Acosta, supra note 285, at 360.
309. See sources in supra note 8.
310. See Part I.A.
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The focus on the NLRB provides an excellent case study for exploring 
these issues with respect to the administrative state more generally.
Independent agencies are prized for their expertise yet like the NLRB, all too
often independence simply means that the dominating political power 
controls the fortunes of the agencies. Expertise fails to the wayside and serves 
as the smokescreen for political influence. Many of the issues discussed in
this Article concerning the effect that partisanship has on multi-member 
panels as well as how agencies empirically decide cases should also be
addressed by other agencies as well. From this analysis, we see that 
partisanship characterizes the process probably more than it should. While
the system is designed in some sense to be a partisan process, there comes a
point where expertise equates to partisanship. Agencies like the NLRB
should not hide their decision-making behind the veil of expertise. 
Partisanship can and does have influence in determining how independent 
agencies will rule, but there comes a point where expertise falls to the 
wayside. The NLRB should adopt additional institutional features to lessen
the influence of partisanship in the process. Changes like mandating panel 
diversity or engaging in more consistent rulemaking would better allow the 
Board to leverage its expertise. This change, moreover, would influence how 
appellate courts react to Board decisions, because instead of frequently 
overturning Board decisions, courts would be more likely to defer to the
expertise of the agency. 
